

The Washington Metrorail Safety Commission



Safety Audit

of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Audit of Metrorail's Control Center and Rail Operations



Final Report:
August 27, 2025

Table of Contents

Executive Summary	1
Background and Scope	3
Metrorail’s Control Center	5
Current Organizational Structure	5
Metrorail’s Office of Rail Transportation	5
Current Organizational Structure	5
Internal Metrorail Reviews and Associated iCAPAs	6
Control Center Internal Safety Review.....	6
Office of Rail Transportation Internal Safety Review.....	7
Audit Work	9
Assessment of Previous Corrective Action Plans.....	9
What the WMSC Found	26
Positive Practices	27
Findings and Minimum Corrective Actions	28
Next Steps	50
Appendices	51
Appendix A: Personnel Interviewed	52
Appendix B: Site Visits	52
Appendix C: Documents Reviewed	53
Appendix D: (PTASP) Elements	70

Prepared under the authority of the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

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Executive Summary

The Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC) performed this audit of Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) Metrorail's control center and rail operations through in-depth interviews, site visits, and document and data reviews conducted in October and November of 2024, with additional follow-up and document reviews through March 2025.

The audit scope included the assessment of Metrorail operations both on the mainline and in rail yards, as well as station managers and station operations, and the control center operations. This includes personnel such as interlocking operators, rail vehicle operators (train operators), station managers, rail supervisors, and other associated management, as well as training personnel, and quality assurance personnel.

To meet the audit objectives, the WMSC reviewed operational practices, procedures, equipment, modifications, and associated training in relation to rules, procedures, regulations, and best practices. The WMSC also verified the forgoing against Metrorail's safety plans governing policy and procedure development, implementation and compliance,

Audit scope included the assessment of Metrorail operations both on the mainline and in rail yards, as well as station managers and station operations, and the control center operations.

management structure, planning and governance, and associated training for the control center and rail operations generally.

This audit also focused on Metrorail corrective action plans including corrective action plans as a result of WMSC findings, WMATA-recommended corrective actions that are overseen by the WMSC, and other corrective actions previously closed by entities such as the National Transportation Safety Board and the Federal Transit Administration.

This audit identified 9 findings and 3 recommendations. The findings and recommendations are:

- ▶ **Finding 1: Metrorail does not have a sufficient number of rail traffic controllers and turnover is increasing.**
- ▶ **Finding 2: Rail traffic controller written assessments, final assessments, and certification tests present conflicting data regarding an individual's aptitude.**

Each of the nine findings and 3 recommendations are fully outlined in the Audit Findings section of this report.

- ▶ **Finding 3:** Metrorail does not provide refresher training to rail vehicle operators on incidents and emergencies.
- ▶ **Finding 4:** Metrorail's Train the Trainer (T3) program for Rail Training is not defined by Metrorail's procedures.
- ▶ **Finding 5:** Metrorail revised ATC local control procedures without first informing all affected staff including rail traffic controllers.
- ▶ **Finding 6:** Rail traffic controller consoles have been manipulated without their knowledge.
- ▶ **Finding 7:** Metrorail uses Microsoft Teams chats during safety events but has not demonstrated a review of these records when determining the facts of these events.
- ▶ **Finding 8:** Metrorail documents have not been updated on the required cadence.
- ▶ **Finding 9:** Metrorail personnel are not following Metrorail radio transmission rules such as for train identification and location information.

Recommendation 1: Metrorail 'Service Disruption' calls during safety events are led by personnel who are actively managing the event rather than the designated role (Metro 1).

Recommendation 2: Rail traffic controllers Advanced Information Management (AIM) system alarms are not standardized across rail traffic controller desks and personnel are not trained on how to arrange their alarm screens.

Recommendation 3: Metrorail does not evaluate the effectiveness of Line Platform Instructors (LPI).

Each finding above is fully outlined with the associated evidence in the Audit Findings section of this report. Metrorail is required to propose corrective action plans to address each finding no later than 30 days after the issuance of this report.

There were also several positive practices and improvements since the prior related audits which are outlined in the Positive Practices section of this report. The WMSC appreciates the cooperation of Metrorail personnel throughout the interviews and observations conducted for this audit.



Background and Scope

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The WMSC conducted 69 in-depth interviews with personnel.


The WMSC conducted the primary portion of this audit in October and November of 2024 and received follow-up documentation through December 2024. Additional follow-up and document reviews were completed in February and March 2025. As part of this audit, the WMSC conducted 69 in-depth interviews with personnel who work in WMATA's Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center (control center), Office of Rail Transportation, or Technical Training and Development.

The WMSC also conducted the following observation activities:

- Observation of pre-trip inspection at Greenbelt Rail Yard
- Observations at the control center including rail traffic controllers, Car Maintenance Desk, Power and Maintenance Desks
- Observation of Rail Training class
- Observation of rail traffic controllers in the course of their duties at the control center
- Observation of rail vehicle operator certification activities
- Observation of rail traffic controllers in the course of their duties at the control center
- Observation of Power Desk activities at the control center
- Observation of quality assurance personnel performing compliance and testing activities

The audit was based on the **WMATA's Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan (PTASP) effective December 31, 2023 (Rev. 4.0)**, Metrorail's procedures and documentation, and other associated requirements. The specific elements of the Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan covered in this audit are listed in Appendix D.

The next sections present a general description of the control center and rail operations, a review of investigations and other oversight activities, review of previous corrective action plans required, and descriptions of the WMSC's findings and recommendations from this audit.






Metrorail's Control Center

Current Organizational Structure


MICC – Maintenance Section



MICC – Rail Section



MICC – Communications Section



Metrorail's Office of Rail Transportation

Current Organizational Structure

Office of Rail Transportation

Directors



- 3 Active employees
- Responsible for management of all division operations for designated lines.

Superintendents



- 9 Active employees
- Responsible for managing the safe, day-to-day operations of rail services and field operations for designated lines /divisions.

Assistant Superintendents



- 10 Active employees
- Responsible for effectively managing the line functions of train and station operations.

Rail Ops Supervisors



- 98 Active employees
- Responsible for supervising rapid transit employees engaged in trains, stations, and yard operations.

Rail Station Supervisors



- 9 Active employees
- Supervises employees engaged in, station operations and customer service.

Station Managers



- 529 Active employees
- Responsible for the safe and efficient operation of rail station services.

Train Operators



- 638 Active employees
- Responsible for transporting customers throughout WMATA's rail system.

Depot Clerks



- 38 Active employees
- Responsible for assigned work orders to support Operators, Station Managers, and Interlocking Operators.

IOs, Clerks, Runners, etc.



- Responsible for supporting train, station, and yard operations throughout divisions.

* Credit: Metrorail's Internal Safety Review, Office of Rail Transportation Report, dated August 16, 2024.

As indicated in Finding 9 of this report, radio transmission repeat back remains an issue.

Internal Metrorail Reviews and Associated iCAPAs

Control Center Internal Safety Review

Metrorail's Quality Assurance, Internal Compliance & Oversight (QICO) conducted an Internal Safety Review of the Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center (MICC) Rail Section in 2023 culminating in the final report, dated February 8, 2024. That internal safety review cited 5 "Areas for Improvement" or findings, which are required to be addressed through internal corrective action plans (iCAPAs). Two of the findings are repeat findings.

- **Internal Metrorail Finding FS-ROCC-23-01:** *Full adherence to the Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR) radio transmission guidelines ensures critical radio communication is understood and followed. Noted as a repeat internal finding.*

Internal Metrorail iCAPA QICO-ROCC-24-01: Implement a process to enforce radio communication compliance. (Overall Risk: 2B)

To address this finding Metrorail developed the Rail Section Universal Rules Compliance Program Plan which includes the Rail Section Internal Assessment of Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) duties. From this Plan, Metrorail trained Rail Traffic Controllers followed by 6 months of assessments of radio checks for compliance with the procedure.

The WMSC appreciates the identification of this finding and associated iCAPA. However, as indicated in Finding 9 of this report, radio transmission repeat back remains an issue.

- **Internal Metrorail Finding FS-ROCC-23-02:** *Actively monitoring and reducing workplace distractions increases effectiveness of personnel.*

Internal Metrorail iCAPA QICO-ROCC-24-02: Monitor and enforce Rail Section's workplace activities. (Overall Risk: 3C)

Metrorail installed an internet filter on applicable Rail Section workstations to restrict personnel access to non-business-related websites. Monitoring was implemented to ensure that the filters installed had the desired effect.

- **Internal Metrorail Finding FS-ROCC-23-03:** *Accurate and timely documentation of quality records in Maximo provides transparency to internal and external customers.*

Internal Metrorail iCAPA QICO-ROCC-24-03: Enforce Maximo incident data entry guidelines. (Overall Risk: 4B)

Control center management issued a staff notice to applicable Rail Section personnel to reinforce adherence to procedure MICC-ALL-PRO-12, MICC Maximo & Defect Reporting. Then, control center personnel reviewed a sample of 15 records from three months of incident reports as evidence of implementation.

- **Internal Metrorail Finding FS-ROCC-23-04:** *Creating and maintaining approved policies and procedures within specified timeframes establishes the foundation for their implementation. Noted as a repeat internal finding.*





Internal Metrorail iCAPA QICO-ROCC-24-04: Promptly review and update all applicable Rail Section's documentation. (Overall Risk: 3D)

Control center personnel submitted an updated document matrix outlining current documented processes and status, including revision, date of last review and date of next review. Metrorail personnel then distributed the latest revision of RTRA-506-01-06, Train Operations Guide & Procedural Checklists, to applicable personnel and required acknowledgement from all active, applicable personnel.

Although the WMSC appreciates the efforts, several documents not included in the document matrix, such as job descriptions and other procedures provided for this audit as "current," were past the required review period for such documents. See Finding 8 of this report.

Procedures provided for this audit as "current," were past the required review period for such documents.

- **Internal Metrorail Finding FS-ROCC-23-05:** *Completing and maintaining required training helps employees to perform their jobs effectively.*

Internal Metrorail iCAPA QICO-ROCC-24-05: Develop a training matrix in compliance with PTASP standards and enforce training completion per requirements. (Overall Risk: 4C)

Control center personnel updated its training matrix to align with documented requirements such as the Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan, Quality Management System Plan (QMSP), and Department of Rail Section procedures. Metrorail personnel monitored adherence to training requirements over a six-month period.

Office of Rail Transportation Internal Safety Review

Metrorail's Quality Assurance, Internal Compliance & Oversight conducted an Internal Safety Review of the Office of Rail Transportation in 2024 culminating in the final report, dated August 16, 2024. That internal safety review cited 7 findings, including some repeat findings from previous audits which are described below.

- **Internal Metrorail Finding FS-RTRA-24-01:** *Rail Transportation employees are not in compliance with established training requirements. Noted as a repeat internal finding.*

Internal Metrorail iCAPA QICO-RTRA-24-01: Develop a procedure to periodically review training records. (Overall Risk: 2E)

Rail Transportation intends to develop a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for managing training requirements for all active, applicable personnel, including a new tracking process.

- **Internal Metrorail Finding FS-RTRA-24-02:** *Train operators were observed not sounding train horns when entering and exiting tunnel portals, as required by the Metrorail Operating Rulebook.*

Internal Metrorail iCAPA QICO-RTRA-24-02: Review existing rules and develop a communication plan on proper horn usage procedures. (Overall Risk: 3C)

Rail Transportation is reviewing current Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR) requirements outlining train horn usage and will update the rules as applicable. Rail Transportation will provide training, an awareness campaign, and compliance testing against MOR requirements.



WMSC found continuing issues with control center personnel not adhering to existing procedures in the documents supplied for this audit.

- **Internal Metrorail Finding FS-RTRA-24-03:** *Rail Transportation has governing documentation past due for review/revision or containing discrepancies. Noted as a repeat internal finding.*

Internal Metrorail iCAPA QICO-RTRA-24-03: Adhere to existing document control work instruction and remove or revise outdated and superseded documents. (Overall Risk: 3D)

Metrorail's response to this finding was to update the appropriate documents and to follow their existing process, but this CAP did not require additional training, acknowledgement, or reminders on existing procedures for applicable personnel. This response will not address the root cause of the issue.

The WMSC found continuing issues with rail operations personnel not adhering to existing procedures in the documents supplied for this audit. See Finding 8 of this report.

-
- **Internal Metrorail Finding FS-RTRA-24-04:** *Rail Transportation Safety Universal Data System Incident/Accident Reports do not include all required information. Noted as a repeat internal finding.*

Internal Metrorail iCAPA QICO-RTRA-24-04: Follow the Safety Management System (SMS) incident investigation process to ensure accurate collection, and thorough recording of all required incident/accident data. (Overall Risk: 4C)

Rail Transportation intends to update its Standard Operating Procedure RTRA 301-02-01, "SMS Incident Investigation Process" to include all required data entry fields in the electronic form, provide training for applicable personnel and implement compliance monitoring for this process.

-
- **Internal Metrorail Finding FS-RTRA-24-05:** *Rail Transportation did not provide a comprehensive training matrix meeting Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan requirements. Noted as a repeat internal finding.*

Internal Metrorail iCAPA QICO-RTRA-24-05: Update training matrix to identify all required training for each position within Rail Transportation. (Overall Risk: 4C)

Rail Transportation personnel will need to consider all Metro-wide, Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan, Department of Safety, Quality Management System Plan, departmental and specific job position training to update its training matrix so it is fully inclusive of all requirements.

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- **Internal Metrorail Finding FS-RTRA-24-06:** *Rail Transportation did not provide any evidence of Job Hazard Analysis Implementation.*

Internal Metrorail iCAPA QICO-SAFE-22-06: "Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) will develop an internal directive for WMATA organizational departments to identify, create, and store JHA's. Department of Safety will also create a centralized library for the storage of completed and current JHA's." Closure of that iCAPA, SAFE-22-06, should resolve this finding; therefore, no separate CAP was created.





➤ **Internal Metrorail Finding FS-RTRA-24-07:** *Rail Transportation was unable to provide evidence of routine Safety Committee meeting participation.*

Internal Metrorail iCAPA QICO-RTRA-24-06: Implement updated plan inclusive of executing, documenting and storing routine safety committee meetings. (Overall Risk: 4D)

Uniform Rules Compliance Program will work with the Facility Safety Committee (FSC) Meeting

Charters developed by Rail Transportation chairs for all applicable Rail Transportation locations and ensure ongoing minutes and action plans are developed based upon committee participation.

As with all Metrorail internal safety reviews, the WMSC will continue to monitor each of these findings and the associated corrective action plans to completion and further evaluate their effectiveness in future inspections and audits.

Audit Work

The WMSC received initial documents related to this audit from Metrorail in September 2024, made subsequent document requests, and reviewed the documents provided by Metrorail throughout the course of this audit. The WMSC conducted an entrance conference on October 16, 2024, and conducted site visits and 58 interviews with Metrorail personnel in October and November 2024. The WMSC held an initial exit conference with Metrorail on January 14, 2025. Based on feedback and additional documents received after the initial exit conference the WMSC reviewed additional documents and conducted 11 additional interviews in February and March 2025. A second exit conference was held with Metrorail on April 21, 2025 to review the revised findings and recommendations cited in this report.

Lists of documents reviewed, site visit locations, and personnel interviewed for this audit are provided in the appendices.


The WMSC provided a draft of this report to Metrorail in June 2025, for technical review and incorporated any comments or technical corrections as appropriate.

Assessment of Previous Corrective Action Plans

During the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission's first triennial cycle of audits (2019-2022), the functional areas of control center and rail operations were two separate audits. On September 8, 2020, the WMSC issued its **first report on Metrorail's Rail Operations Control Center**. As a part of that audit, the WMSC issued 21 findings to Metrorail. Then on April 7, 2022, the WMSC issued its **first audit report on Metrorail's Rail Operations**. As part of that audit, the WMSC issued 14 findings and 3 recommendations to Metrorail.

Below is a summary of each finding or recommendation from prior audits, orders, or directives that relate to the control center or rail operations, along with the review and status of the associated corrective action plans developed by Metrorail to address them.

WMSC will continue to monitor each of these findings and the associated corrective action plans to completion and further evaluate their effectiveness in future inspections and audits.



▶ **C-0006 (Closed)**

*The Rail Operations Control Center must be appropriately staffed to meet the current operational needs. (Federal Transit Administration finding that was **re-issued by the WMSC via directive on 9/10/2019.**)*

To address this finding, Metrorail completed an assessments of its personnel levels, organization, hours of work permitted and limitations to determine the proper staff levels. The WMSC approved CAP C-0006 for closure on June 8, 2021.

▶ **C-0007 (Closed)**


*The Rail Operations Control Center must be appropriately staffed to meet the current operational needs. (Federal Transit Administration finding that was **re-issued by the WMSC via directive on 9/10/2019.**)*

Based on assessments completed under CAP C-0006, Metrorail created a staffing timeline to achieve the necessary personnel levels. The plan indicated that 90% of the allocated positions would be filled by the end of 2016. The WMSC approved CAP C-0007 for closure on September 2, 2020.

▶ **C-0009 (Closed)**

*The operator cab camera was blocked due to the intentional placement of a movable visor to block the camera view. WMATA shall institute controls to prevent an operator from using the visor to obstruct the camera. (Federal Transit Administration finding that was **re-issued by the WMSC via directive on 9/10/2019.**)*

To address this finding, Metrorail issued a Permanent Order in 2018 to modify MSRPH Operating Rule 3.13; this modification included a positive check of the 7K cab sun visor position before scheduled departures from terminal locations. Metrorail conducted an awareness campaign on the issues surrounding the sun visors along with system-wide compliance observations. The WMSC approved C-0009 for closure on January 30, 2020.



▶ **C-0010 (Closed)**

*The operator cab camera was blocked due to the intentional placement of a movable visor to block the camera view. WMATA shall develop a training module to implement the Visor Placement order for RTRA operational personnel (Train Operators, RTRA Supervisors, Interlocking Operators, and other operational personnel). (Federal Transit Administration finding that was **re-issued by the WMSC via directive on 9/10/2019.**)*

To address this finding, Metrorail developed and conducted formal training. The WMSC approved C-0010 for closure on January 30, 2020.

► **C-0011 (Closed)**

*The operator cab camera was blocked due to the intentional placement of a movable visor to block the camera view. WMATA shall schedule and conduct localized safety stand-downs using the training module and provide the WMSC training rosters when completed. (Federal Transit Administration finding that was **re-issued by the WMSC via directive on 9/10/2019.**)*

To address this finding, Metrorail scheduled and conducted localized safety stand-downs using the training module completed for C-0010. The training rosters were provided to the WMSC once completed. The WMSC approved C-0011 for closure on January 30, 2020.

► **C-0012 (Closed)**

*The operator cab camera was blocked due to the intentional placement of a movable visor to block the camera view. WMATA shall develop a service bulletin adding a Visor Placement procedure to CMNT daily safety inspections and provide the WMSC with service bulletin for approval prior to implementation. (Federal Transit Administration finding that was **re-issued by the WMSC via directive on 9/10/2019.**)*

Metrorail developed and distributed the corresponding service bulletin. The WMSC approved C-0012 for closure on January 30, 2020.

► **C-0013 (Closed)**

*The operator cab camera was blocked due to the intentional placement of a movable visor to block the camera view. Develop an Engineering solution/method to address the finding. (Federal Transit Administration finding that was **re-issued by the WMSC via directive on 9/10/2019.**)*


To address this finding, Metrorail initiated an engineering modification to use a roll-type screen for all railcars. The modifications were completed, and all cars were verified to have the modified screens. The WMSC approved C-0013 for closure on January 8, 2021.

► **C-0014 (Closed)**

*The operator cab camera was blocked due to the intentional placement of a movable visor to block the camera view. Incorporate Lesson Learned to 8K Series Railcar. (Federal Transit Administration finding that was **re-issued by the WMSC via directive on 9/10/2019.**)*

To address this finding, Metrorail committed to incorporate a sunshade, as opposed to a visor that was originally installed on the 7000 Series railcars. Metrorail committed to ensuring a proper safety certification process inclusive of hazard analysis for design, manufacture, and operation, as well as a certifiable items list (CIL) for the future 8000 series railcars. The WMSC approved C-0014 on September 2, 2020.





► **C-0015 (Closed)**

*Metrorail lacks adequate controls to reduce station overruns. (WMSC finding **issued via directive on 11/25/2019.**)*

To address this finding, Metrorail worked to define station overruns, review current processes of train approach speeds per station and make updates as necessary. Metrorail worked to create a review committee to review the incidents and root causes and address as necessary. The WMSC approved C-0015 for closure on August 30, 2021.

► **C-0018 (Closed)**

*Metrorail must do more to prevent unauthorized use of PEDs (Personal Electronic Devices). Require employees to turn over (or cause to be turned over) devices and records upon request. (WMSC finding **issued via directive on 11/25/2019.**)*

Metrorail revised its Electronic Device Policy to require operators involved in an incident or accident to turn over electronic devices and device records upon request. The WMSC approved C-0018 for closure on September 2, 2020.



► **C-0019 (Closed)**

*Metrorail must do more to prevent unauthorized use of PEDs (Personal Electronic Devices). Developing a program to actively detect unauthorized presence and use of electronic devices through video review, inspection, and efficiency testing; and raising awareness of the PED policy and inspection activities through training, stand downs, and similar activities. (WMSC finding **issued via directive on 11/25/2019.**)*

To address this finding, Metrorail developed a written program/procedure to detect unauthorized use of electronic devices. Quality control and random video reviews were conducted to ensure adherence to the Electronic Device Policy. The WMSC approved C-0019 for closure on June 8, 2021.

► **C-0020 (Closed)**

*Dysfunction in the ROCC during unplanned events detracts from the ROCC's ability to manage the rail system appropriately and effectively. (WMSC finding **issued via directive on 12/20/2019.**)*

This CAP resulted in many changes within the control center including the review of the Control's Centers culture and processes. This included recommendations on the organizational structure, management, communication and tools to strengthen the safety culture. Additional trainings were provided and Metrorail's Quality team became more involved to provide additional verification and feedback. The WMSC approved C-0020 for closure on November 24, 2021.

► **C-0035 (Closed)**

ROCC Controllers are not prepared to operate the emergency ventilation fans to respond to smoke and fire events, which could lead to a repeat of the January 12, 2015 L'Enfant Plaza station electrical arcing and smoke accident, or worse. (WMSC finding **issued via directive on 5/12/2020.**)



To address this finding, Metrorail created a training module and developed a proficiency training process and verification on the operation of ventilation fans. All control center rail traffic controllers, assistant superintendents, and superintendents completed the new training program. Since C-0035 closed, the responsibility for fan operation has moved to a fan desk and fan controllers trained and assigned to operate the emergency ventilation fans. WMSC approved C-0035 for closure on June 8, 2021.

► **C-0036 (Closed)**


ROCC management routinely remotely manipulates controllers consoles without expressly sharing or coordinating train movement plans with the controllers, which is an unsafe practice that could lead to a collision, derailment or jeopardize the safety of front-line personnel under the direction of controllers. (WMSC finding **issued via directive on 5/12/2020.**)

Metrorail created procedures to document that remote manipulation is prohibited and how it should be documented, if ever required. Reports were submitted to the WMSC for review over a 6 month period showing compliance for all individuals involved. The WMSC approved C-0036 for closure on March 10, 2021, however, see Finding 5 of this report as similar issues were cited during this audit which contradict the procedures Metrorail put into place.

► **C-0037 (Closed)**

Third rail power restoration is routinely rushed by ROCC management with a focus on restoring train service rather than a focus on following safety procedures. (WMSC finding **issued via directive on 5/12/2020.**)

Metrorail instituted interim safety measures as part of C-0037 while longer-term safety measures were being developed. However, in January and February 2021, the WMSC identified that Metrorail was bypassing the interim safety measures that were intended to ensure the safety of personnel during third rail power restoration. Despite communicating this to Metrorail, and the subsequent implementation of process revisions and trainings, personnel continued bypassing the interim safety measures during third rail power restoration. Metrorail submitted a closure request for C-0037 on April 29, 2022. The WMSC declined that request via an **order issued on May 17, 2022** that required Metrorail to re-evaluate and revise its processes and procedures surrounding third rail power restoration. The WMSC approved C-0037 for closure on September 15, 2022 as it was superseded by the May 17, 2022 order and the CAP created to implement that order: C-0212.





► **C-0049 (Open)**

ROCC management contributes to a chaotic environment. Use of profanities, threats and racial, sexual or other forms of harassment are regular features of the Control Center's environment, which makes it difficult for controllers to do their jobs and drives low morale and significant turnover. (2020 Rail Operations Control Center Audit, finding 1.)

This CAP remains open and, as presently scheduled, Metrorail actionable item submittals are due to the WMSC through August of 2025. However, based on this audit, additional modification is necessary to enable this CAP to fully address the underlying finding. For a full history of this CAP, and its current status, see the Finding 1 of this report.

► **C-0050 (Closed)**

ROCC management attempts to manipulate safety event investigations and baselessly threatens controllers with arrest or termination. (2020 Rail Operations Control Center Audit, finding 2.)

To address this finding, Metrorail updated its standard operating procedure for Incident and Accident Investigation for Bus and Rail to ensure proper steps are followed with regard to chain of custody and evidence preservation procedures to protect the integrity of all investigations. Metrorail also defined responsibilities of the control center and Office of Safety personnel during safety investigations. Safety, human resources, and information technology established processes and procedures for direct access to Metrorail's audio recording systems. The WMSC approved C-0050 for closure on June 8, 2021.

► **C-0051 (Closed)**

Metrorail does not record all critical ROCC communications, limiting the lessons that can be learned from safety events. (2020 Rail Operations Control Center Audit, finding 3.)

To address this finding, Metrorail assessed and identified all gaps in recording of critical control center communications, which included all desks or locations in the control center room, phone lines, ambient recording locations, and radio recordings. Metrorail's information technology department analyzed the control center and submitted technical design specifications to demonstrate the redundancy capabilities of the recording system and provided evidence that adequate storage exists to ensure proper retention and access for later investigation. The WMSC approved C-0051 for closure on November 29, 2023.

► **C-0052 (Closed)**

There is no consistent, clear, concise, immediate and reliable Metrorail communication process for safety-critical information between Metrorail personnel and fire liaison. (2020 Rail Operations Control Center Audit, finding 4.)

To address this finding, Metrorail reviewed the roles and channels of communication within the control center as such relate to fire liaison personnel. Control center procedures were updated to more clearly define the role and responsibilities of the fire liaison. Training on the

updated procedures was then provided to all applicable personnel. Additional data displays were added within the control center to which include real-time alerts. The WMSC approved C-0052 for closure on November 29, 2023.

▶ **C-0053 (Closed)**

Some Metrorail procedures lack the required urgency to address life-safety issues. (2020 Rail Operations Control Center Audit, finding 5.)

To address this finding, Metrorail reviewed and updated the fire and smoke procedures and checklists. A training program was developed for the fire liaison role that includes an instructor guide, participant manual, and compliance checklist based upon the revised procedures. This updated training was presented to all personnel who are able to serve in the fire liaison role. The WMSC approved C-0053 for closure on February 9, 2023.

▶ **C-0054 (Closed)**

Repeated failures to address safety issues have contributed to a culture where frontline workers no longer see any value in reporting and recording problems. (2020 Rail Operations Control Center Audit, finding 6.)

To address this finding, Metrorail began implementing the safety management system (SMS) to change the control center culture. Metrorail actively identified, assessed, tracked, and mitigated risks. Safety risk coordinators were put in place in each of the various departments throughout Metrorail (first with the control center as part of C-0054) to assist with running this new SMS system. Metrorail also addressed gaps in audio recording within the control center that had previously gone unaddressed. The WMSC approved C-0054 for closure on April 5, 2022.

▶ **C-0055 (Closed)**

WMATA does not always follow or clearly define its fatigue risk management procedures for the Rail Operations Control Center, including those limiting the length of controller shifts. (2020 Rail Operations Control Center Audit, finding 7.)

To address this finding, Metrorail assessed its rail traffic controller schedule and then updated the schedule to ensure compliance with Metrorail's Policy Instruction on Fatigue Risk Management (P/I 10.6/1). Control center personnel were then required to establish a process to fully adhere to the policy instructions, which included ensuring compliance with minimum staffing levels. Personnel were trained on the policies and procedures to maximize ongoing compliance. The WMSC approved C-0055 for closure on December 16, 2022. Staffing levels remain an issue in the control center, see the Finding 1 of this report.





▶ **C-0056 (Open)**

Metrorail's ROCC recruitment and retention approach is failing. Some controller trainees have left the ROCC immediately after, or shortly after, the training course, which is scheduled to last nine months. (2020 Rail Operations Control Center Audit, finding 8.)

This CAP remains open and, as presently scheduled, Metrorail actionable item submittals are due to the WMSC through August of 2025. However, based on this audit, additional modification is necessary to enable this CAP to fully address the underlying finding. For a full history of this CAP, and current status, see the Finding 1 of this report.

▶ **C-0057 (Closed)**

A high rate of staff turnover in the Rail Operations Control Center contributes to staffing challenges and a lack of positive institutional knowledge that can contribute to safety challenges. (2020 Rail Operations Control Center Audit, finding 9.)

To address this finding, Metrorail developed new procedures and processes for obtaining feedback from staff, including a new procedure for exit interviews to gather data to attempt to improve retention. This CAP focused on the practices surrounding hiring and retention rather than the staffing levels. Metrorail was able to establish new practices to assist with recruitment and retention. The WMSC approved C-0057 for closure on November 18, 2022.

▶ **C-0058 (Closed)**

Controllers still have too many responsibilities and are frequently rushed to complete tasks by management. (2020 Rail Operations Control Center Audit, finding 10.)

To address this finding, Metrorail completed an organizational assessment which included an overview of the workload for each role in the control center. As a result of this assessment, Metrorail revised and reassigned duties to ensure adequate workload level. The WMSC approved C-0058 for closure on December 16, 2022.

▶ **C-0059 (Closed)**

WMATA has failed to regularly update the Rail Operations Control Center Procedures Manual. (2020 Rail Operations Control Center Audit, finding 11.)

To address this finding, Metrorail inventoried, reviewed, and updated the Control Center Procedures Manual. The updated procedures were then incorporated into initial and refresher training materials for relevant control center staff. The training matrices and controlled procedures were reviewed as a part of this audit. The WMSC approved C-0059 for closure on September 24, 2024. During the course of this audit, several documents were found beyond their revision period. This is outlined within Finding 8 of this report.

► **C-0060 (Closed)**

WMATA has not reviewed SOPs or OAPs on a regular basis. (2020 Rail Operations Control Center Audit, finding 12.)

To address this finding, the control center established a new document control procedure to govern all control center-owned procedures. This procedure established the revision cycle required for all controlled control center documentation at least once every two years. A central repository of documents was created along with a master documents log. The WMSC approved C-0060 for closure on May 4, 2023. There were some documents reviewed during this audit that had not been reviewed in accordance with Metrorail's policies. See related Finding 8 of this report.

► **C-0061 (Closed)**

Ride alongs are not effectively utilized to increase controller knowledge, contributing to a lack of controller understanding of what is actually happening on the roadway. (2020 Rail Operations Control Center Audit, finding 13.)

To address this finding, Metrorail developed a ride along procedure and schedule to provide rail traffic controllers with field experiences for more familiarization with work tasks on the roadway. The WMSC approved C-0061 for closure on October 13, 2022.

► **C-0062 (Closed)**

Controllers are not provided with the full extent of training necessary to do their jobs, including sufficient familiarization with roadway operations and procedures. (2020 Rail Operations Control Center Audit, finding 14.)


To address this finding, Metrorail now requires that control center personnel be trained on Roadway Worker Protection with the exception of the on-the-job training requirements as control center personnel would not be serving as a roadway worker. The training was scheduled, completed, and added to the job requirements of applicable control center personnel. The WMSC approved C-0062 for closure on March 4, 2022.

► **C-0063 (Closed)**

Aspects of ROCC training are inconsistent and must be structured. Multiple controllers reported that significant time is wasted during initial training. (2020 Rail Operations Control Center Audit, finding 15.)



To address this finding, Metrorail created an entirely new curriculum and pace for the initial training of rail traffic controllers. The WMSC approved C-0063 for closure on March 4, 2022. During this audit, the WMSC found inconsistencies with the new training program, but these inconsistencies are unrelated to the structure or time issues that were identified and addressed as part of C-0063. See Finding 2 of this report for additional details.





► **C-0064 (Closed)**

Required on the job training (OJT) is not carried out in a structured or standardized fashion. (2020 Rail Operations Control Center Audit, finding 16.)

To address this finding, Metrorail's Office of Rail Quality Training updated its procedures for the initial and refresher trainings for control center staff, which included on the job training and time on the control center floor soon after hire/start of training. Training documents including the training methodology, the frequency of training, training documentation, and training effectiveness were provided for review. The WMSC approved C-0064 for closure on April 28, 2022.

► **C-0065 (Closed)**

Not all controllers experience emergency drills. If each ROCC controller does not get this experience, it diminishes the value of the drills. (2020 Rail Operations Control Center Audit, finding 17.)

To address this finding, Metrorail began conducting internal skills drills with rail traffic controllers to practice and enhance recall of procedures when encountering incidents. Records reviewed during this audit indicate that rail traffic controller participation in skills drills continues to occur. The WMSC approved C-0065 for closure on October 3, 2023.

► **C-0066 (Closed)**

The certification process for ROCC instructors, assistant superintendents, superintendents and controllers is inconsistent, not properly documented, and lacks proper controls to ensure the integrity and meaning of certification. (2020 Rail Operations Control Center Audit, finding 18.)

To address this finding, Metrorail transferred the responsibility of certifications to its Rail Transportation Quality team. New procedures also were created to better standardize the certification process for instructors, assistant superintendents, superintendents, and rail traffic controllers. The WMSC approved C-0066 for closure on September 15, 2022.

During this audit, the WMSC found continuing challenges with rail traffic controller training. See Finding 2 of this report.

► **C-0067 (Closed)**

Certification and recertification scenarios required of ROCC employees are repeated year after year, diminishing the value of the testing and training process. (2020 Rail Operations Control Center Audit, finding 19.)

To address this finding, Metrorail created its Performance Standardization Program Manual which includes random selections of scenarios for certifying testing and new scenarios. The WMSC approved C-0067 for closure on March 4, 2022. Metrorail indicated during this audit that they are in the process of revising its testing and certification for some control center personnel, including rail traffic controllers.

► **C-0068 (Closed)**

WMATA does not have a standardized training program for personnel working at desks such as the MOC or ROIC. Metrorail could not provide any documentation of MOC training materials, a curriculum, or a training description. Metrorail provided only a study guide for the ROIC. (2020 Rail Operations Control Center Audit, finding 20.)

To address this finding, Metrorail developed and submitted a Maintenance Operations Center Training Program and a Rail Operations Information Center Training Program that are now in alignment with Metrorail's procedures and provides minimum training and certification/recertification standards for each position. Re-training was provided for applicable personnel within these positions. The WMSC approved C-0068 for closure on March 21, 2024.

► **C-0069 (Closed)**

WMATA does not have minimum training requirements for Metrorail employees or contractors who serve in the fire liaison position. (2020 Rail Operations Control Center Audit, finding 21.)

To address this finding, Metrorail worked with the relevant jurisdictions to outline the requirements, and Metrorail will provide a memo detailing the job requirements for the fire liaison position. The fire liaison position is staffed by fire personnel from one of the three jurisdictions (Maryland, Virginia, or the District of Columbia). Since this finding, Metrorail and the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (MWCOG) Fire Chiefs Committee updated its Emergency Policy Agreement in 2024 to further outline the requirements for the fire liaison role. The WMSC approved C-0069 for closure on August 30, 2021.

► **C-0101 (Closed)**

Metrorail does not have, provide training on, or otherwise follow specific rules related to rail vehicle and switch movement in non-signalized territory. Further, Metrorail provides no controls on or oversight of movement in dark territory. (WMSC finding issued via directive on 4/30/2021.)

To address this finding, Metrorail established a safety standard by defining non-signalized and non-electrified areas in rail yards. A permanent order was developed based upon this safety standard and communicated to all relevant Metrorail personnel. The WMSC approved C-0101 for closure on May 2, 2024.



► **C-0181 (Closed)**

Elements of Metrorail have a culture that accepts noncompliance with written operational rules, instructions, and manuals. (2022 Rail Operations Audit, finding 1.)

To address this finding, Metrorail began to implement a new safety management system which included new processes and tools to identify, assess, and mitigate safety risks, such as those introduced by change as defined in its Agency Safety Plan. The SMS program has a new





safety risk submission form and dashboards for assessments of risks. New personnel were stationed in various departments to collect and review this information to help ensure that Metrorail is addressing risks to noncompliance. The WMSC approved C-0181 for closure on September 9, 2024.

▶ **C-0182 (Open)**

Metrorail does not effectively identify, track, communicate and address operational hazards as required by its Agency Safety Plan. (2022 Rail Operations Audit, finding 2.)

As noted in C-0181, Metrorail implemented its new safety management system to identify, track, communicate and address operational hazards. This finding also required specific actions by the Communications & Signaling personnel to update control panels at all identified locations. The anticipated closure date for C-0182 is November 15, 2025.

▶ **C-0183 (Open)**

Metrorail creates safety risks by not requiring and conducting territory familiarization and physical characteristics training, and not assessing knowledge of physical characteristics prior to assigning operations personnel work on a line, in a terminal or in a yard. (2022 Rail Operations Audit, finding 3.)

Metrorail continues to work towards completion of territory familiarization and physical characteristics training at the time of this audit. Metrorail conducted a pilot of this training in 2024; however, that pilot did not achieve the desired results. Metrorail is in the process of revising the training and intends to conduct a second pilot prior to proceeding with training all applicable personnel. The anticipated closure date for C-0183 is December 15, 2026.

▶ **C-0184 (Closed)**

Metrorail has inadequate internal communication, coordination and processes to effectively manage change as required by its PTASP, the WMSC, and the FTA. (2022 Rail Operations Audit, finding 4.)

As noted in C-0181, Metrorail implemented its new safety management system to address this finding. The SMS included review of safety risks that can be introduced by changes made within the organization. The WMSC approved C-0184 for closure on April 18, 2024.

▶ **C-0185 (Closed)**

Metrorail is not effectively training and certifying personnel authorized to operate trains on all active railcar fleets. (2022 Rail Operations Audit, finding 5.)

To address this finding, Rail Transportation updated its performance standards to ensure that personnel receive training and certification on the different types of Class 1 Rail Vehicles within Metrorail's fleet (presently two types: legacy—comprising of the 3000-series and 6000 series—and the 7000-series). Additional processes were created to track this training as part of the certification process for Rail Vehicle Operators. The WMSC approved C-0185 for closure on June 26, 2024.

► **C-0186 (Closed)**

Metrorail is not meeting its operational refresher training and recertification requirements. (2022 Rail Operations Audit, finding 6.)

Specifically, this finding identified lapsed certifications for both positions that require a rail vehicle operator (train operators) certification and station managers. To address this finding, Metrorail revised procedures for training and recertification of rail vehicle operators. C-0186 was approved for closure on February 23, 2023.

Thereafter, **on February 28, 2024, the WMSC issued an order** identifying Metrorail was not following its procedures for certification for train operations: “designating train operators as certified despite their certification documents indicating that those individuals did not attempt and successfully complete all of the tasks required for certification that are specifically included in Metrorail’s Performance Standardization Program.” In contrast to the issue that was addressed by C-0186, the certification appeared valid on its face; however, the underlying certification components underpinning that expiration were invalid when examined against Metrorail’s procedures. This resulted in two findings and two corresponding corrective action plans: C-0268 and C-0269.

► **C-0187 (Closed)**

Metrorail has not documented procedures for terminal supervisors, and has not established the effective formal training for terminal supervisors needed to safely perform their duties. (2022 Rail Operations Audit, finding 7.)

To address this finding, Metrorail developed a Terminal Supervisor Manual that defines the job responsibilities, including safety responsibilities and procedures, for terminal supervisors. This manual was added to the training requirements for new and existing terminal supervisors. The WMSC approved C-0187 for closure on October 3, 2023.

► **C-0188 (Closed)**

Metrorail does not have documented criteria to determine student proficiency in practical demonstrations of safety critical operational tasks. (2022 Rail Operations Audit, finding 8.)

To address this finding, Metrorail developed a “Student Proficiency Ratings Matrix” for all practical exercises as part of rail vehicle operator training. The matrix established criteria for personnel to determine student proficiency in safety-critical operational tasks. Additional training was provided to instructional personnel on how to use the matrix to properly assess and grade rail vehicle operator students. The WMSC approved C-0188 for closure on June 30, 2023.





► **C-0189 (Open)**

Metrorail does not ensure personnel serving as on-the-job training instructors, including those personnel described as line platform instructors (LPIs), are effective and have specific training and direction on what to teach and how to assess their assigned students. (2022 Rail Operations Audit, finding 9.)

Line Platform Instructors (LPIs) are personnel in the field responsible for the training of Rail Transportation personnel, including rail vehicle operators. To address this finding, Metrorail created a documented process to address oversight of LPIs. As part of C-0189, Rail Transportation personnel reviewed student evaluations and identified LPI student pass/fail trends for practical certifications. The anticipated closure date for C-0189 is September 22, 2025.

See Recommendation 3 of this report for a related recommendation on evaluations of LPI effectiveness.

► **C-0190 (Closed)**

Metrorail does not provide safety oversight of all safety equipment that is or may be past its calibration date that may be in use by operations personnel. (2022 Rail Operations Audit, finding 10.)

To address this finding, Metrorail created new processes for high voltage gloves and radios, both of which require calibration. Safety bulletins were provided to Metrorail personnel on the new processes. Field compliance checks were put into place for these processes. The WMSC approved C-0190 for closure on May 19, 2023.

► **C-0191 (Closed)**

Some RTRA QA/QC audits contain conclusions that do not match actual conditions. RTRA's QA/QC procedures do not include complete work instructions for all audits or specific instructions for removing personnel from service. (2022 Rail Operations Audit, finding 11.)

To address this finding, Metrorail developed a documented process for the quality control manager position that will include regular spot checks of its quality assurance/quality control officer audits. Updated QA/QC Work Instructions were created to align with Rail Transportation QA/QC Internal Auditing procedures. Verifications were completed to ensure accuracy of the QA/QC audits. The WMSC approved C-0191 for closure on November 2, 2023.

► **C-0192 (Closed)**

Metrorail closes internal corrective actions and identified issues, including those related to RTRA QA/QC audits, without fully identifying or completing required improvements or changes. (2022 Rail Operations Audit, finding 12.)

To address this finding, Metrorail updated the Rail Transportation Quality Control Corrective Action Request Procedure to ensure that corrective actions are only closed when completed and fully documented. Managers who approve corrective actions were trained on the process to properly complete and document corrective actions. The WMSC approved C-0192 for closure on October 3, 2023.

► **C-0193 (Open)**

With frequent modifications due to temporary and permanent orders, and outdated versions of Metrorail's rulebook being distributed to personnel when hard copies are available, the latest Metrorail rules are not easily accessible to train operators. This creates document control issues and makes a rule requiring personnel to carry the latest version of the Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH) unrealistic. (2022 Rail Operations Audit, finding 13.)

As of September 1, 2023, Metrorail transitioned from the Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH) to the Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR). New procedures exist for updating the MOR. These procedures include the Rail Safety Standard Committee (RSSC) processes to assign the responsibility for dissemination of temporary and permanent orders to RSSC members and their respective departments and ensure that all appropriate personnel maintain those orders with their rule books. The Office of Rail Transportation performs compliance checks. Metrorail continues to assess possible electronic solutions to the rulebook, along with these revisions to the physical distribution and maintenance of copies. The anticipated closure date for C-0193 is July 20, 2026.

► **C-0194 (Closed)**


Metrorail does not conduct effective oversight of training instructors. (2022 Rail Operations Audit, finding 14.)

To address this finding, Metrorail updated SOP OPMS-001 "OPMS (Operations Management Services) Standard Operating Procedures" to ensure that supervisor evaluation of training instructors is required in the field. The WMSC approved C-0194 for closure on June 1, 2023.

► **C-0195 (Closed)**

Metrorail operations departments do not have effective processes to consider and act upon safety input from employees at all levels of the organization. (2022 Rail Operations Audit, recommendation 1.)

Metrorail addressed this recommendation through implementation of its new safety management system along with onboarding and training personnel to address safety risks. The WMSC approved C-0195 for closure on May 17, 2024.





▶ **C-0196 (Closed)**

Metrorail has an opportunity to improve training by assigning dedicated instructors to each division. (2022 Rail Operations Audit, recommendation 2.)

To address this finding, Metrorail training personnel conducted a feasibility study but found that centralizing training to one location and department would better serve all of Metrorail. The WMSC approved C-0196 for closure on June 16, 2023.

▶ **C-0197 (Closed)**

Interlocking operators are authorized to hand crank switches, are not being certified to take this action. (2022 Rail Operations Audit, recommendation 3.)

To address this finding, Metrorail assessed the current interlocking certification performance standards to determine additional training activities needed for personnel conducting interlocking operator certifications. The interlocking operator's proficiency evaluation forms for interlocking operations were revised to include a field for entry of the manual switch operations task and an information block to capture the identifying number of the yard switch cranked and clamped during the exercise. The WMSC approved C-0197 for closure on March 24, 2023.

▶ **C-0198 (Closed)**

Metrorail has an opportunity to improve the integrity of its certification process by establishing a procedure providing for QA/QC personnel to be certified by an entity other than their own colleagues. (2022 Rail Operations Audit, recommendation 4.)

To address this finding, Metrorail Rail Transportation Quality & Training personnel developed a certification program for quality assurance/quality control officers. Active QA/QC officers were then trained and certified according to the new procedures. The WMSC approved C-0198 for closure on July 27, 2023.

▶ **C-0268 (Open)**

Metrorail is not performing its train operator certification activities reliably and consistently in accordance with its safety requirements specified in its Agency Safety Plan and the associated Performance Standardization on Program Manual. Therefore, Metrorail is not ensuring that its trains are only operated by personnel who have demonstrated the skills required to do so safely. (WMSC finding issued [via order on 2/28/2024.](#))

Metrorail continues timely work to address this CAP. To-date, Metrorail has updated the Performance Standardization Program Manual, provided training to certification officers and rail training inspectors, developed a new class 1 rail vehicle operator certification work instruction, developed a PowerBI application to flag operators who have not been

certified or whose certifications are coming due soon, and has begun submitting a series of quality control implementation reports and other reports. This reporting will continue for the remainder of the CAP life cycle. The anticipated closure date for C-0268 is May 11, 2026.

► **C-0269 (Open)**

Metrorail is not conducting retraining of personnel who do not pass certification exams as required by its Performance Standardization Program Manual, and is not consistently retesting these personnel as specified in its safety procedures. (WMSC finding issued via order on 2/28/2024.)

Metrorail continues timely work to address this CAP. To-date, Metrorail has updated the Performance Standardization Program Manual and begun submitting a series of compliance reports that will continue for the remainder of the CAP life cycle. The anticipated closure date for C-0269 is February 2, 2026.

The WMSC continues to monitor Metrorail's implementation and effectiveness of corrective action plans through our robust oversight program, which includes inspections such as record reviews.





What the **WMSC** Found

What the **WMSC** Found

Positive Practices

This audit also identified several positive practices, or success stories, some of which came about as a direct result of the WMSC's oversight. The WMSC encourages Metrorail to continue these positive practices.

- 1.** Metrorail transitioned into a new control center facility since the previous, 2020 WMSC audit of the control center. The control center developed a new, more integrated concept of its command line. It has also integrated Rail, Bus, Transit Police, Power Desk, Maintenance Operations Center, Bus Operations, Communications, Video Operations Center, and Emergency Operations Center within a new and updated control center facility with new equipment.
- 2.** Investigation interviews are no longer being coached. Over the course of this audit, personnel gave distinct un-coached answers. This was evident based on the interviews and nature of the feedback provided to the WMSC throughout this audit.
- 3.** There are functioning microphones at all desks/locations in the control center and ambient audio is also being recorded from all desks/locations. Metrorail and the WMSC achieved this positive practice through CAP C-0051.
- 4.** Metrorail is following the fatigue management policy that is applicable to rail traffic controllers. Metrorail and the WMSC achieved this positive practice through CAP C-0055.
- 5.** The Power Desk function is performing as intended and reducing the risk of electrocution for those on the roadway. Metrorail and the WMSC achieved this positive practice through CAP C-0212.
- 6.** Rail Supervisor Daily Activity Reports (RSDARs) are completed with a greater level of specificity that now provides more information to aid future use of the data.
- 7.** There are now formalized training courses for terminal supervisors and interlocking operators. Metrorail and the WMSC achieved this positive practice through CAP C-0187.

Metrorail transitioned into a new control center facility since the previous, 2020 WMSC audit of the control center. The control center developed a new, more integrated concept of its command line.





Findings and Minimum Corrective Actions

Findings and Minimum Corrective Actions

► **Finding #1: Metrorail does not have a sufficient number of rail traffic controllers and controller turnover is increasing.**

Proper staffing levels are vital for the safe operation of the entire Metrorail system. This is the basis for Metrorail's ability to safely and effectively conduct maintenance work, conduct normal operations, and respond to emergency events. The prior section acknowledges the positive improvements that Metrorail has implemented in the control center since 2020.

Requirement:

The American Public Transportation Association standard on Operations Control Centers (APTA-RT-OP-S-005-03 Rev 3) includes section 10, Determination of adequate operations control center staffing levels:

"The rail transit system shall evaluate all factors that affect the adequate level of staffing in the OCC to ensure safe, efficient, and sustainable staffing levels that allows safe management of the system. At a minimum, factors to consider shall include: Hours of service; Fitness for duty; Attrition; Minimum staffing requirements; Training and qualification periods; System modifications / expansions; Procedural changes; Retraining and requalification periods; Sick, personal, and vacation time; Special events; Continuity of operations; and Contractual obligations."

Nonconformance:

Two corrective action plans, C-0049 and C-0056, from the WMSC's first control center audit remain open and were in progress up to this audit. However, despite periods of increased staffing levels, those corrective action plans did not result in a sustained adequate staffing level and the Metrorail-determined staffing level of 61 rail traffic controllers has never been achieved.


C-0049 was intended to address work environment challenges and C-0056 was intended to address inadequate staffing and staff turnover. Both C-0049 and C-0056 included many of the same actionable items because the control center work environment and high rate of staff turnover were seen as contributors to the control center's inadequate staffing.

Metrorail took the 2020 audit findings and associated CAPs seriously, which led to increased rail traffic controller staffing levels for a time: Total number of controllers peaked at 50 in November 2022 then dropped to 41 in January 2023 before peaking again at 51 in March of 2024. At the time of this report, there are 46 rail traffic controllers.

Metrorail has made several positive improvements based upon these CAPs including running three training classes occurring simultaneously, a second training room in development for additional capacity, and MICC Rail over-hires its vacancies to account for attrition during training and any RTC departures.

As part of C-0049, actionable item 2 (submitted to the WMSC on April 23, 2021), the ROCC Recruitment Plan states that "Based on best practices, and grounded in WMATA's Fatigue Policy 10.6/1 and Local 2 Collective Bargaining Agreement, staffing requirements

Proper staffing levels are vital for the safe operation of the entire Metrorail system.



The Control Center reached 52 controllers in March 2024.

within the ROC are as follows: 61 Rail Traffic Controllers Needed.” Metrorail has never reached those assessments requirements for a 61 rail traffic controller threshold.



Controller Staffing



Background on Control Center Staffing Levels

The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) completed a **Safety Management Inspection (SMI) of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) rail and bus systems culminating in a report issued on June 17, 2015**. As part of that report, the FTA issued Safety Directive 15-1 identifying 54 safety findings and 91 required actions to improve safety. Finding R-1 of the report stated that “WMATA’s Rail Operations Control Center is significantly understaffed.” At that time, the control center had 48 budgeted positions for rail traffic controllers with a then-staffing level of 37 rail traffic controllers. This finding was later re-issued by the WMSC and became corrective action plan C-0056.



Metrorail has completed several actionable items required by these CAPs including personnel assessments, cultural change assessments, and changes in recruitment and has seen positive impact and increased staffing based on completion of these items.



The WMSC's subsequent Audit of the **Department of Rail Transportation: Rail Operations Control Center** (dated September 8, 2020) issued several findings related to personnel, staffing, and staff turnover. The control center's high staff turnover rate was a direct contributor to the staffing challenge and the lack of positive institutional knowledge and experience available to handle complex and stressful situations. As determined during the period of the 2020 audit, achieving and maintaining the required staffing levels is crucial to the safety of everyone in the Metrorail system.

C-0049 (corresponds with Finding 1 of the 2020 Rail Operations Control Center Audit) was intended to address the finding "ROCC management contributes to a chaotic environment. Use of profanities, threats and racial, sexual or other forms of harassment are regular features of the Control Centers environment, which makes it difficult for controllers to do their jobs and drives low morale and significant turnover."

C-0056 (corresponds with Finding 8 of the 2020 Rail Operations Control Center Audit) was intended to address the finding "Metrorail's ROCC recruitment and retention approach is failing. Some controller trainees have left the ROCC immediately after or shortly after the training course, which is scheduled to last nine months."

Metrorail has completed several actionable items required by these CAPs including personnel assessments, cultural change assessments, and changes in recruitment and has seen positive impact and increased staffing based on completion of these items. Metrorail is also currently conducting three training classes occurring simultaneously and has a second training room in development to add additional capacity.

Metrorail requested to close C-0049 and C-0056 in November 2023 as both CAPs timelines were set to complete, however, Metrorail had not achieved the staffing levels for rail traffic controllers that Metrorail outlined as the "staffing requirement within the ROC" of "61 Rail Traffic Controllers Needed." The WMSC met with Metrorail personnel in January and February 2024 to further discuss control center staffing. As part of a CAP modification, Metrorail submitted an updated staffing assessment that proposed 43 rail traffic controllers but budgeted up to 51 to account for operational variables. The WMSC did not accept the new staffing assessment because it did not sufficiently account for factors that would affect this efficiency such as report-writing, breaks, absenteeism, vacation, training, attrition, and any other sort of absence from the desk. That proposed staffing assessment included an attrition rate of 10% when the attrition rate, whether due to promotion or other reasons, is actually higher per Metrorail's records.

The proposed staffing assessment would normalize the practice of having fewer than two controllers at a desk. This contravenes Metrorail's earlier assessment that determined each desk requires at least two controllers to "meet[] operational requirements." The WMSC communicated to Metrorail that the previous assessment conducted and submitted on December 31, 2020, remains the benchmark because it was based on best practices and industry research and resulted in the determination that 61 rail traffic controllers are necessary to safely run the rail system. That is, three controllers per desk so that each desk, on each shift, may be operated in a safe manner that also achieves Metrorail's stated operational requirements.

As part of the current audit, the WMSC interviewed 36 frontline workers in the control center such as rail traffic controllers, assistant operations managers, communications personnel, and maintenance personnel.

Both C-0049 and C-0056 were modified on April 25, 2024, but only to extend reporting requirements on staffing as the objectives of both CAPs had not been met by their original intended closure date of December 1, 2023. The additional items include staffing reports and meetings with the WMSC to review staffing and data trends.

As part of the current audit, the WMSC interviewed 36 frontline workers in the control center such as rail traffic controllers, assistant operations managers, communications personnel, and maintenance personnel. In total, 67% of these personnel had a negative outlook on the culture of the control center. This number rises to 76% if only rail traffic controller personnel are included.

The following chart indicates the number of instances where control center staff spoke about the issues negatively. The parenthetical includes examples of the types of words used. This chart provides the context for the 67% negative outlook of the control center staff interviewed. Personnel could have stated 1, or all 4, of the issues below during their interview.

Issue Stated	Number of Control Center Personnel
issues with business culture (hostile or toxic)	11
issues with peers (inexperience, attendance)	18
issues with management (decision-making)	24
desire to leave control center employment	20

In Metrorail’s cultural assessment data from C-0049’s closure request, 31% of control center management personnel would recommend the control center as a “great place to work” as of October 2023, which was down from 83% in January of 2021. Also, the Metrorail cultural assessment indicates that 64% of the metrics collected had trended negatively from January 2021 to October 2023. There were several questions included in these cultural assessments which asked Metrorail personnel, “I recommend the ROCC as a great place to work,” “I receive the right amount of support and guidance from my direct supervisor,” “I am sufficiently trained to do my job effectively,” “I believe my workload is reasonable for my role,” “I am fully empowered to do my job,” “When I raise concerns, ROCC managers take them seriously and address them properly,” and “My team focuses on fixing the problem rather than finding someone to blame.”

Metrorail conducted additional surveys in January 2024, October 2024, and May 2025 which included three prompts for control center staff to provide feedback. One of the survey prompts was “I feel positive about my work environment” which was 48% in January 2024, 30% in October 2024, and then 53% in May 2025. The participation rates for these surveys varied from 28% participation in January 2024, to 70% in October 2024, and then 53% in May 2025.

The second survey prompt asked personnel to give their opinion if “Operations at Metro now run more smoothly than they did before the integration of the Metro Integrated Command Center (MICC).” For managers, this was 26% in January 2024, 38% in October 2024, and 47% in May 2025. Frontline workers reported agreement at 43% in January 2024, 37% in October 2024, and 45% in May 2025.



Once the WMSC approves the corrective action plan to address this new finding, the existing corrective action plans C-0049 and C-0056 will be superseded by this one, new corrective action plan.

The third prompt was on the perception of leadership, asking if “MICC leadership has been responsive to the needs of employees.” For managers, agreement was 35% in January 2024, 46% in October 2024, and 44% in May 2025. For frontline personnel, it was 46% in January 2024, 41% in October 2024, and 46% in May 2025.

Once the WMSC approves the corrective action plan to address this new finding, the existing corrective action plans C-0049 and C-0056 will be superseded by this one, new corrective action plan.

◆ Minimum Corrective Action:

Metrorail must evaluate its current operational environment through a staffing assessment that accounts for factors such as report-writing, breaks, absenteeism, vacation, training, actual attrition rate, and any other sort of absence from the rail traffic controller console. For the new staffing assessment to take effect, the WMSC must approve it; if approval is not received, the 2020 assessment requiring 61 rail traffic controllers remains the required benchmark. Metrorail must establish a hiring and retention plan that fulfills staffing requirements with a timeline for implementation, achievement, and maintenance of the required staffing level. To monitor factors that contribute to employee retention, Metrorail must regularly conduct culture assessments and solicit feedback to ensure the trending issues affecting attrition are addressed.

► Finding 2: Rail traffic controller written assessments, final assessments, and certification tests present conflicting data regarding an individual’s aptitude.

Properly trained, and certified, rail traffic controllers are vital to ensuring the safety of personnel on the roadway including Metrorail personnel and riders. Metrorail has developed training courses for these personnel along with specific certification requirements which must be passed prior to being certified as a rail traffic controller.

Requirement:

MICC-ROC-MAN-01, Performance Standardization Program Manual for Rail Traffic Controller Operations, dated July 25, 2024, states that employee standards must be defined, documented, and published “that meet the requirements established by the MICC Rail Section, Rail Transportation, and the ROQT [Rail Operations Quality Training]; a. Developing methods of measuring employee performance in comparison with established standards; b. Monitoring the performance of the workforce as a whole, and adjusting performance standards, as appropriate.” Additionally, it must be ensured that “the quality of instruction is such that employees are prepared to meet the prescribed standards of performance upon completion of their formal training (initial or refresher).”

Nonconformance:

In 2024, Metrorail launched a new ‘pilot’ rail traffic controller (RTC) Training program. To date, this program has been implemented for three full RTC classes, each class consisting of approximately 8 students. As context, the three classes of approximately 24 controllers total represents 39% of the total number of RTCs needed to fully staff the control center.



Although Metrorail managers continue to refer to the program as a “pilot,” a significant portion of the personnel currently or soon to be assigned to the control center will have completed this training.

Although Metrorail managers continue to refer to the program as a “pilot,” a significant portion of the personnel currently or soon to be assigned to the control center will have completed this training. The program involves six weeks of classroom instruction, followed by on-the-job training, and concludes with a certification exam. Throughout the audit, those responsible for training, on-the-job instruction, and for managing the new personnel expressed concerns that the six-week classroom portion is insufficient. This is based on direct observation of personnel who advanced to the on-the-job phase without having acquired the essential foundational knowledge necessary for their roles.

Metrorail’s Performance Standardization Manual currently addresses only the final written tests and practical exams, but it does not take into account the written assessments during the course itself. During the WMSC’s review of the documents, there were 8 documented instances, from June 2024 to November 2024, where students failed the written final exam but passed the practical exam, sometimes on the same day, and are subsequently certified as a rail traffic controller.

Another practice of Metrorail’s rail traffic controller certification process is that rail traffic controllers certify with a partner on the console. However, this practice makes it challenging for training personnel to assess whether an individual RTC-trainee has met the prescribed standards of performance on their own. As a certified RTC, an individual may work a console alone (including the radio and the button functions) without another RTC. And even when two RTC are on one console as intended, it is critical that Metrorail’s RTC certification process result in two qualified RTC on that console.

In response to a preliminary finding during the exit conference of the audit on January 14, 2025, Metrorail issued a statement on January 31, 2025, which noted: “The WMSC identified inconsistencies in RTC assessments, where allegedly unsatisfactory quizzes and written tests did not prevent certification if the practical exam was passed. WMATA contests this finding, as its methodology aligns with the rail traffic controller Performance Standardization Manual.” However, having a training program where students fail written assessments but pass the practical exam and are certified as rail traffic controllers solely on the basis of passing a limited practical exam presents a conflict of whether an individual has achieved the prescribed standards of performance.

Metrorail also stated: “The Office of Technical Training and Development plans to update the RTC certification process and intends to implement training trend data analyses for RTC students.” This data collection initiative is a positive step toward addressing this concern.





Metrorail provides vital training to rail vehicle operators on incidents and emergencies which includes items such as best course of action to resolve incidents and emergencies utilizing all available resources in a timely manner. This training is only provided during the initial rail vehicle operator training.



♦ **Minimum Corrective Action:**

Metrorail must thoroughly review its rail traffic controller training program to ensure that adequate training is provided before rail traffic controllers are certified. Assessments should be incorporated throughout the training process to evaluate whether individual trainees possess the prescribed standards of performance at each milestone. Trend analysis of the assessments must be conducted and considered to drive further improvements to the training program. Rail traffic controllers who fail assessments during the course must receive additional training on the areas in which they are struggling before advancing to the next phase of their training. The grading of assessments conducted throughout the course, the written final exam and the practical exam play in whether a student controller succeeds in being certified as a controller. Practical exams for certification must replicate real world conditions that the rail traffic controllers would encounter and such practical exams must vary over time such that rail traffic controllers cannot reasonably anticipate the scenario.

► **Finding 3: Metrorail does not provide refresher training to rail vehicle operators on incidents and emergencies.**

Metrorail provides vital training to rail vehicle operators on incidents and emergencies which includes items such as best course of action to resolve incidents and emergencies utilizing all available resources in a timely manner. This training is only provided during the initial rail vehicle operator training. It is addressed in the ongoing certification process, but this certification is not training.

Requirement:

Metrorail's Operation Rulebook, Section 1.7.1 states that "Operational employees are required to pass examinations on the rules and procedures contained in this manual, as well as on the information contained in other manuals that apply to their assignments. These examinations shall be administered at least once every 12 months." Rail vehicle operators and rail supervisors receive training on incidents and emergencies in the Train Operator Incidents and Emergencies course taken during their initial training to obtain certification to operate rail vehicles; however, there is no ongoing or refresher training provided.


Nonconformance:

On November 21, 2024, as part of audit document requests, the WMSC requested that Metrorail "Provide the records of training of rail vehicle operators on emergencies conducted from November 1, 2023 to November 1, 2024." Metrorail replied to this request on November 21, 2024 with records that included the course Rail Vehicle Operator Incidents & Emergencies. This course was conducted for several rail vehicle operator classes including classes 24-04, 24-05, and 24-06. Each of these classes of rail vehicle operators received training on incidents and emergencies.

As the objectives note, this initial training includes incidents and emergencies but is only provided one time.

The Train Operator Incidents and Emergencies Participant Manual, dated February 7, 2024, lists the objectives of the 5-day course as:

- Describe the roles and responsibilities of a Train Operator, and other WMATA internal departments and outside emergency responders related to all emergencies and incidents on the WMATA railroad.
- Demonstrate correct understanding and compliance of all SOP's procedures and instructions.
- Provide the best course of action to resolve incidents and emergencies utilizing all available resources in a timely manner.
- Handle all appropriate train equipment and their functions including the handling of alarms, doors, and onboard HVAC systems during an incident.
- Describe the procedures in detail for the Emergency take of down and Safety of Third Rail Power.
- Manage on board emergencies, incidents, and safe evacuations. [and]
- Manage effective communications and other strategies for train operating requirements during an incident.



As the objectives note, this initial training includes incidents and emergencies but is only provided one time—as a new rail vehicle operator. The only exceptions to this are targeted non-routine training that may arise based on updates to the Metrorail Operating Rulebook. Personnel from Metrorail's Technical Training and Development confirmed in interviews that rail vehicle operators do not receive recurring training as it relates to incidents and emergencies.

As part of the investigation into the January 12, 2015 electrical arcing and smoke accident near L'Enfant Plaza Station, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) identified the critical role of a well-trained rail vehicle operator during an emergency event: "When the operator of train 302 shut down the ventilation system, only the ventilation system on the leading railcar shut down immediately, and the ventilation systems of all the other railcars remained operational." This led to smoke infiltrating the other train cars quickly.

As a result, the NTSB issued two recommendations relevant to rail vehicle operators regarding incidents and emergencies:

- ▶ **R-16-019:** "Ensure that all train operators are trained and regularly tested on the appropriate procedure for emergency shutdown of railcar ventilation."
- ▶ **R-16-020:** "Incorporate a specific test in your efficiency testing program to ensure that train operators understand the procedure for emergency shutdown of railcar ventilation."



A robust and consistent training program for the trainers is therefore critical to safe rail vehicle operations.

In the same year the Tri State Oversight Committee (TOC) issued the following finding in the WMATA Rail Transportation (RTRA) Audit “Finding 1: RTRA does not provide annual refresher training to Train Operators.” (NTSB/RAR-16-01.)

The WMSC acknowledges the work done under CAP C-0162 in regard to initial and refresher emergency management training, which includes training on incident response, events, accidents and protocols that must be followed to manage each of these under the National Incident Management System (NIMS) framework. This finding is specific to emergency operations training which covers operations related to rail vehicles themselves during and after an incident or emergency.

◆ **Minimum Corrective Action:**

Metrorail must develop and provide refresher training to rail vehicle operators. This training must include elements of the initial training provided to rail vehicle operators. This training must be provided at a regular cadence.

► **Finding 4: Metrorail’s Train the Trainer (T3) program for Rail Training is not defined by Metrorail’s procedures.**

Trainers are the personnel responsible for ensuring that rail vehicle operators have the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities to safely and effectively operate a rail vehicle before doing so with passengers. A robust and consistent training program for the trainers is therefore critical to safe rail vehicle operations.

Requirement:

Metrorail currently uses a ‘Train the Trainer’ process that is not documented or defined by Metrorail procedure.

Nonconformance:

Train the Trainer (T3) programs are defined as specialized training initiatives designed to prepare experienced facilitators to effectively deliver a new training program. These programs focus on equipping facilitators with the specific knowledge, skills, and instructional techniques needed to understand the content of the new program thoroughly and to deliver it in a way that engages learners and meets the program’s learning objectives. Metrorail’s three components of the T-3 process are to take the class, observe the class and then teach the class.

On November 21, 2024, as part of this audit, the WMSC requested the “Current T-3 process (train the trainer) training documentation including the procedures and checklists.” As well as requested “Signed and dated T-3 supervisory evaluations and checklists for the newly hired instructors from September 1, 2023 through September 1, 2024”.

Metrorail provided select records for various trainees but did not provide evidence of a defined train the trainer program or procedure that evaluates the progress and aptitude of the new instructor. Effective trainers are crucial to effectively training rail vehicle operator success. A formalized, documented train the trainer program would help to ensure a degree of standardization across trainers while bolstering the trainers own individual skills.



Metrorail further stated that it is actively rewriting the train the trainer process to create updated procedures for all training programs.

In response to this preliminary finding presented to Metrorail on January 14, 2025, Metrorail provided additional documents on January 31, 2025. The documents illustrate an existing known process despite the lack of a procedure; however, the documents show the trainee taking one class and observing a different class. The trainee paperwork should show that all 3 steps (take the class, observe the class, and teach the class) completed for any one class and include an evaluation completed by Metrorail.

Metrorail further stated that it is actively rewriting the train the trainer process to create updated procedures for all training programs. The updated procedures are planned to include procedures to onboard, train, evaluate, and coach new training instructors. The WMSC appreciates Metrorail's ongoing work to address this finding.

◆ **Minimum Corrective Action:**

Metrorail's must fully document its train the trainer process in a procedure. Metrorail must ensure that all applicable personnel receive training on this procedure and related processes. Metrorail must evaluate the effectiveness of the train the trainer program at a regular cadence.

▶ **Finding 5: Metrorail revised ATC local control procedures without first informing all affected staff including rail traffic controllers.**

Under Metrorail's procedures, automatic train control personnel may take local control of roadway operations including switch control while conducting inspections or maintenance work. Specific procedures must be followed to ensure the safety of personnel in the field and for riders, which requires that personnel are updated on any changes to these procedures.

Requirement:

Metrorail's Procedure MICC-ROC-PRO-02, Rail Section Training Process Standard Operating Procedure, dated August 7, 2024 states "6.3.1.2 When an existing document is updated, or a new document is created in the Rail Section, the MICC Document Controller notifies the MICC Director or its designee. Acknowledgements are then sent to the appropriate Rail Section personnel based on the Rail Section Training Matrix. Once an acknowledgement is sent, Rail Section personnel will receive an email from MetroDocs that contains the document that they must review. Additionally, the email contains an official acknowledgement statement that Rail Section personnel agree to by acknowledging the document. Once Rail Section personnel have read and fully understand the content and requirements of the Rail Section document, they shall click and sign the acknowledgement in MetroDocs."

Nonconformance:

While conducting an observation at the control center on November 1, 2024, WMSC personnel were informed by two rail traffic controllers that personnel in the field had changed procedures in regard to ATC local signal control and the requirement to contact the control center to set each route. In the past, ATC personnel only contacted rail traffic controllers in the certain train routes being set, however personnel had begun contacting the control center





It is positive that this practical drift from the MOR requirements was identified.

for all routes being set. The Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR) states in section 17.19.12.1 that “Automatic Train Control Maintenance employee must not display a signal for train movement unless: Authorized by the Rail Traffic Controller”.

WMSC personnel went to the command line to discuss with personnel serving in the Metro 1 role at the time. Metro 1 stated that there was a memorandum sent out on this noting that the MOR sets the guidelines, but it may not have reached the rail traffic controllers.

As part of the WMSC’s document request for this audit dated November 21, 2024, the WMSC requested this memo which was received from Metrorail on December 3, 2024. The memo is dated October 24, 2024 and states “Recently, there has been an increase in misrouting trains when using local signal control operations. These incidents have led to operational delays and significant inconvenience to our customers. To prevent such occurrences in the future, all personnel using Local Signal Control protection are required to strictly adhere to the Metro Operating Rulebook 17.19 Local Control (17.19.1 through 17.19.17.3). Specifically, according to MOR 17.19.12, Automatic Train Control Maintenance employees must not display a signal for train movement unless authorized by the Rail Traffic Controller.”

Although it is positive that this practical drift from the MOR requirements was identified and guidance sent out to correct the issue, it was not distributed to the rail traffic controllers. Personnel should be given opportunity to review the information and be instructed what to do if the instructions are unclear.

◆ **Minimum Corrective Action:**

Metrorail must ensure that personnel are adhering to Metrorail Operating Rulebook requirements for ATC Local Control procedures. Regular compliance checks should be done to ensure applicable personnel understand and have received proper notification of the actions being taken or revisions to procedures. Lessons learned need to be distributed to all personnel affected.

▶ **Finding 6: Rail traffic controller consoles have been manipulated without their knowledge.**

Metrorail rail traffic controllers rely on screens to monitor and direct the flow of train movement. Uncoordinated remote manipulations without the responsible rail traffic controller’s knowledge could create the risk of trains entering prohibited, which could lead to collision, derailment, or other harm to personnel and riders. Metrorail prohibits such uncoordinated movements.

Requirement:

Metrorail Procedure Number MICC-ALL-PRO-07 ‘Rail Operations Computer System (ROCS) Console Management in the MICC’, dated April 22, 2024, Section 6.3.7, states that “MICC personnel are prohibited from console manipulation.”



Four different rail traffic controllers described firsthand accounts of what could have been possible console manipulation.



Nonconformance:

During the first WMSC triennial audit of Metrorail's control center, the WMSC found that "ROCC management routinely manipulates controllers' consoles without expressly sharing or coordinating train movement plans with the controllers, which is an unsafe practice that could lead to a collision, derailment or jeopardize the safety of front-line personnel under the direction of controllers." (**WMSC Rail Operations Control Center Audit, September 2020.**)

In response to this finding, Metrorail developed corrective action plan C-0036. Shortly after this corrective action was issued by the WMSC, the control center director issued a cease-and-desist directive on May 15, 2020, advising control center management staff that executing AIM functions should not continue and would be prohibited moving forward. As part of C-0036, Metrorail submitted a procedure and documented process for the monitoring of such actions. Based upon these actions, the WMSC approved C-0036 for closure on March 10, 2021.

As part of the present audit, the WMSC interviewed 11 rail traffic controllers. During those interviews, four different rail traffic controllers described firsthand accounts of what could have been possible console manipulation. Upon receipt of this information the WMSC requested all console manipulation data from November 1, 2023 through November 1, 2024. Documentation provided by Metrorail on December 3, 2024 confirmed that there had been four total instances of console manipulation during that period:

- ▶ **Event #1:** November 8, 2023. Metrorail stated that "The manipulation for this date cannot be explained or confirmed, as the manager on duty at the time of the event is no longer employed at WMATA and could not be interviewed."
- ▶ **Event #2:** December 5, 2023. Metrorail again stated "The manipulation of this date cannot be explained or confirmed, as the manager on duty at the time of the event is no longer employed at WMATA and could not be interviewed."
- ▶ **Event #3:** August 31, 2024. Metrorail stated that "A Rail Traffic Controller was assigned as a test controller for the red-line shutdown between Glenmont and Fort Totten. During this time, the section of the red line was not in revenue service, and the Rail Traffic Controller's role was to manipulate components and devices in the shutdown area. The testing was conducted using the Assistant Superintendent console. However, the testing did not involve the Ops 1 revenue service Rail Traffic Controller, which was necessary to maintain a clear separation between revenue and non-revenue functions."
- ▶ **Event #4:** July 19, 2024: Metrorail stated that this was based on the CrowdStrike Outage that occurred on that day.

Upon receiving this as a preliminary finding as presented at the exit conference for this audit on January 14, 2025, Metrorail replied on January 31, 2025, that "The WMSC contends that rail traffic controller (RTC) consoles were manipulated without RTCs' knowledge. If this occurred during an on-site activity or was identified through interviews, the WMSC should have immediately notified MICC leadership or Safety. WMATA requests detailed information



The control center's management provided the memorandum that contained the data to substantiate this finding.

and supporting data to investigate and address this matter. If the WMSC has no such information or is unwilling to provide it, then WMATA strongly requests that the WMSC exclude Preliminary Finding #6 from its draft and final audit reports.”

A member of the control center’s management provided the memorandum that contained the data to substantiate this finding. However, Metrorail was not aware of the instances of console manipulation until the WMSC raised them. This indicates that the monitoring processes that were put into place by corrective action plan C-0036 are no longer functioning as required.

◆ **Minimum Corrective Action:**

Metrorail must review its procedures regarding the monitoring of console manipulation and ensure that personnel are trained on the requirements. Metrorail must monitor console manipulation not less frequently than monthly to ensure that rail traffic controller consoles are not manipulated without their knowledge.

▶ **Finding 7: Metrorail uses Microsoft Teams chats during safety events but has not demonstrated a review of these records when determining the facts of these events.**

Metrorail regularly utilizes Microsoft Teams chats during there are accidents, events or issues on the Metrorail system which are causing service disruptions. When investigating safety events, all possible sources of information should be reviewed (Program Standard Sections 7.A, 8.B.3.) These chats include vital information for investigations and need to be recorded as such.

Requirement:

The WMSC Program Standard Section 8.F.3 states that “The WMSC requires WMATA to make the following information and data related to a safety event available **in the original format** (i.e., may only be altered for purposes of making the data understandable or useable) to the WMSC immediately and simultaneously with WMATA’s receipt as these items are retrieved, gathered, or created (or as soon as practicable thereafter): 3. WMATA instant messaging chats and channels (e.g., Microsoft Teams or similar) that relate to the investigation of a safety event.”

Nonconformance:

Metrorail personnel use multiple Microsoft Teams chat channels to discuss and inform personnel, including management personnel, of incidents and events that affect rail operations. Metrorail Procedure Number MICC-ADM-PRO-02, METRO 1 Role and Responsibilities Standard Operating Procedure dated June 24, 2024 states that the METRO 1 role is “The highest authority operational role on the MICC floor. It is the strategic operational role that coordinates command and communication efforts between the Command Line, WMATA leadership and external groups.”

MICC-ADM-PRO-02 further states “The METRO 1 position is responsible for:

- Familiarizing themselves with this SOP and to strictly adhere to the procedures outlined herein;





- Collaborate and coordinate incident communication responses to provide strategic operational guidance to the Senior Leadership Team on the bus and rail system network;
- Monitor all WMATA wide relevant communication channels to gain knowledge and understanding to keep Senior Leadership Team apprised of any new developments;
- Leads the Command Line by providing strategic guidance on bus and rail operational Matters;
- Coordinates communication between the Senior Leadership Team and the Command Line or their designee for the purpose of reporting on following matters but not limited to:
 - ♦ Facilitate and Manage incident calls via the Operations Service Disruption TEAMS Channel;
 - ♦ Reporting to Senior Leadership Team through internal communication channels to by providing timely updates of major service disruption greater than 20 minutes.”

This communication is critical to managing incidents and events that occur on the Metrorail system. Personnel in interviews confirmed that operational feedback is provided to the control center from Metrorail management via the Teams chat channel.

On November 21, 2024, the WMSC requested “Records of all Operations Service Disruption TEAMS Channel chats and notifications for the period November 1, 2023, through November 1, 2024.”

On December 3, 2024, in reply to this request, Metrorail stated that “The Operations Service Disruption TEAMS Channel is a Metro-wide communications channel, so we do not believe it is appropriate for the WMSC to seek records in response to request number 14. WMATA reserves all rights.”

The WMSC Program Standard specifically requires that an instant messaging—to include Microsoft Teams—be reviewed and analyzed just like any other source of fact gathered as part of the investigation. Chats are one source of fact for what happened during the incident and should therefore be reviewed and considered in WMATA’s investigations for purposes of identifying facts, corroborating facts, or any other valuable investigatory purpose.

♦ **Minimum Corrective Action:**

When conducting investigations, Metrorail must review and include relevant information created by all available communication methods including Microsoft Teams chats. All communication methods must be preserved for future investigation review. Metrorail must make available all data related to rail safety events and investigations which includes “WMATA instant messaging chats and channels (e.g., Microsoft Teams or similar) that relate to the investigation of a safety event” as outlined by the WMSC Program Standard.

Personnel in interviews confirmed that operational feedback is provided to the control center from Metrorail management via the Teams chat channel.



Neither of these internal-to-Metrorail corrective and preventative action plans have addressed the root cause of the outdated documents.

► **Finding 8: Metrorail documents have not been updated on the required cadence.**

Documents risk being irrelevant for their intended purpose and will therefore risk being ineffective in their stated purpose, which could present as a safety issue.

Metrorail has existing procedures and processes to ensure that its documents remain accurate with current practices. Metrorail's Quality Management System Plan states that "Maintaining a system of controls governing key documents is an essential Quality Management System practice for every department and function at WMATA."

Requirement:

Metrorail's Quality Management System Plan (QMSP) dated October 31, 2023. Section 3.2 states that "Metro Organizations and projects include procedures for receiving, transmitting, reviewing, approving, and disseminating, and archiving critical documents in their respective QMPs. These procedures are reviewed and revised in accordance with the Organizational Document Control Procedures or at least every two years unless there are process changes that necessitate an earlier review. This applies to both hardcopy and electronic documents."

Metrorail's RTRA-800-01-01, section 6.5.1 states the same: "The minimum revision period for business-critical documents is two years."

Nonconformance:

Metrorail's Internal Safety Review for the Office of Rail Transportation, dated August 16, 2024, identified 8 documents that were past the required review/revision date. Metrorail created its own internal corrective and preventative action plan (iCAPA) QICO-RTRA-24-03 to address this issue. QICO-RTRA-24-03 is scheduled to complete in September 2025.

This is the same issue identified in a 2023 QICO Internal Review, in which a similar finding (QICO-ROCC-24-04) was issued and required Rail Transportation to "Promptly review and update all applicable Rail Section's documentation." Action was taken to update the identified documents and that iCAPA was subsequently closed on April 12, 2024.

Neither of these internal-to-Metrorail corrective and preventative action plans have addressed the root cause of the outdated documents. No additional re-training or revisions to processes or procedures was required, only a one-time updating of the documents was conducted to bring the affected documents into compliance with Metrorail's policies.

As part of document requests from the present audit, the WMSC received documents that did not meet Metrorail's procedures listed above which include job descriptions, a reporting form and procedures. The past-due-for-review documents identified are:

Job Descriptions:

- 2301 Management Specialist (Metro-wide), last reviewed 1/30/2020
- 7214 Management Assistant (Metro-wide), last reviewed 6/1987
- 6854 RSTO Office Manager (Rail Transportation), last reviewed 3/30/2022

Procedures:

- RTRA Eight (8) HR Violation Report [Rev. 000-01], last reviewed 7/06/2021
- SOP 102-01 Removing an Employee from Service – Version 1.1, last reviewed 01/10/2022
- SOP # 4 CUSTOMER EVACUATION FROM TRAIN, last reviewed 9/24/2021
- SOP # 4A CUSTOMER SELF – EVACUATION FROM TRAINS, last reviewed 10/25/2012
- SOP # 5 CROWD CONTROL AT STATIONS, last reviewed 09/03/2010
- SOP # 24 SICK CUSTOMER ON A TRAIN, last reviewed 09/03/2010

◆ **Minimum Corrective Action:**

Metrorail must create and implement a quality check process that ensures its existing document review processes and procedures occur for all relevant documents. Metrorail must regularly conduct compliance checks to ensure that all required documents meet the existing policy requirements.

► **Finding 9: Metrorail personnel are not following Metrorail radio transmission rules such as for train identification and location information.**

The Metrorail Operating Rulebook defines the requirements for radio transmission and protocol for all personnel on or around its roadway. It is imperative for safety that personnel follow the rules, including identification and repeat backs to ensure the message was properly received and understood.

Requirement:

The Metrorail Operation Rulebook, dated March 1, 2024, section 12.4 Radio Transmission & Reception Procedures states that “12.4.1 Employees shall obtain clearance from their respective radio control points prior to initiating train-to-train, train to-wayside, or portable-to-portable communications; 12.4.2 Employees shall not interrupt radio communications in process except in cases of emergency. 12.4.3 Personnel shall not take any action until they are positive that all radio transmissions or receptions are heard, fully understood, and acknowledged. Individual radio transmissions shall, always, be repeated by the receiver so the transmitter can confirm the message was received completely and by the intended receiver.”



**METRO
RAIL
OPERATING
RULEBOOK**

Nonconformance:

For this audit, the WMSC independently sampled 6 hours of radio communications from January to December of 2024 which included operational channels 1-4, 2 terminals (Largo and Branch Avenue), and 2 rail yards (Greenbelt and West Falls Church Yard). In total there

It is imperative for safety that personnel follow the rules, including identification and repeat backs to ensure the message was properly received and understood.



31 instances of noncompliance with Metrorail's Operating Rulebook.



were 31 instances of noncompliance with Metrorail's Operating Rulebook. The breakdown of the noncompliance is shown below:

January 9, 2024, 1015-1115 Operations Channel 1 Observation

- 1038 - RTC failed to use train ID when giving a permissive block
- 1044 - RTC failed to use train ID when giving a permissive block
- 1107 - RTC failed to use train ID when giving a permissive block
- 1109 - RTC failed to use train ID when giving a permissive block
- 1111 - RTC failed to use train ID when giving a permissive block
- 1113 - RTC failed to use train ID when giving a permissive block

* Distorted Communications - 6 occurrences of field and RTC asked to repeat messages

February 21, 2024, 1700-1800, Operations Channel 2 Observation

- 1714 - Train operator did not use ID in repeat back

August 15, 2024, 1900-2000 Operations Channel 3 Observation

- 1904 - Train did not ID in repeat back
- 1906 - Train did not ID in repeat back
- 1913 -14: 2 trains contacted RTC but RTC did not respond
- 1937 - Train did not repeat back RTC instructions
- 1948 - Train did not ID in repeat back

September 23, 2024, 0400-0500, Operations Channel 4 Observation

- 0445 - RTC failed to use train ID when giving a permissive block
- 0447 - RTC failed to use train ID when giving a permissive block
- 0458 - RTC failed to use train ID when giving a permissive block

October 14, 2024, 0700 - 0800, Largo Terminal Observation


- 0700- Terminal did not identify train, just give signal
- 0705 - Train did not identify in repeat back
- 0705 - Terminal did not identify train ID
- 0713 - Terminal did not identify train ID
- 0717 - Terminal and train did not ID
- 0749 - Terminal did not use train ID
- 0753 - Terminal did not use train ID with two different trains, just signal numbers
- 0800 - Terminal did not ID train



November 8, 2024, 1800-1900, Branch Avenue Terminal Observation

- 1800 - No train ID from train or terminal
- 1804 - Train did not ID in repeat back
- 1808 - Terminal ID the operator not train ID
- 1815 - Terminal did not ID train
- 1819 - Train did not repeat back ID in repeat back
- 1840 - Terminal did not say ID or operator name
- 1848 - Terminal did not say ID or operator name

WMSC Radio Compliance Review - 6 Hour Sample Block



Metrorail had also internally identified this as an issue and created an internal corrective and preventative action plan (iCAPA), QICO-ROCC-24-01, which stated that “Full adherence to the Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR) radio transmission guidelines ensures critical radio communication is understood and followed.” The corresponding Metrorail finding identified that the average compliance of specific radio requirements was 79.6%.

Metrorail further stated on January 31, 2025, in response to the preliminary findings, that “alleged noncompliance with Metrorail Operating Rulebook 12.4 is already addressed in WMATA’s internal safety review (QICO-ROCC-24-01) and associated actionable item submissions. WMATA’s Uniform Rules Compliance Program implemented audits and checklists to ensure adherence to radio communication guidelines in the MICC Rail Section. These efforts led to the satisfactory closure of the related iCAPA on December 27, 2024.”



iCAPA records do not indicate the completion of 6 audits per month.



Metrorail provided additional documents to the WMSC after the January 14, 2025 exit conference for this audit that included this iCAPA QICO-ROCC-24-01 and related rules compliance audits and checklists. The training associated with this iCAPA was conducted in March and April of 2024.

The WMSC appreciates Metrorail identifying this finding and the efforts taken to improve compliance. The internal safety review finding cites issues with both rail traffic controllers and personnel out in the field, but the corresponding iCAPA only focused on personnel within the control center, not all personnel listed in the MOR requirements.

In addition, iCAPA QICO-ROCC-24-01 expressly allowed the schedule and frequency of the rule compliance testing activities to vary based on the number of Assistant Operation Managers (AOM) working each month in the control center; “process requires 6 audits per month, per AOM.” The iCAPA records do not indicate the completion of 6 audits per month. In October 2024, the records provided show a total of 4 audits, 1 of which was a failure for the radio transmission category.

◆ Minimum Corrective Action:

Metrorail must also develop and implement a systematic process that ensures compliance with its communication standards and rules. This process must incorporate regular compliance checks and monitoring on an ongoing basis to check compliance and gather compliance data by departmental supervisors, managers, the safety department, and other personnel. This process must include data analysis from these safety performance checks, regular identification of trends, identification of and completion of needed corrective action, and ongoing validation and analysis of its rule-compliance program effectiveness.

Recommendation 1: Metrorail ‘Service Disruption’ calls during safety events are led by personnel who are actively managing the event rather than the designated role (Metro 1).

When there are issues or events on the Metrorail system which cause a service disruption greater than 20 minutes, personnel are required to facilitate and manage a Microsoft Teams call. This is to lead communication and coordination among management personnel from several Metrorail departments. This call however is led by the same person in charge of trying to resolve the incidents. Personnel involved in resolving an emergency situation should be focused on that situation to ensure the best possible outcomes.

Requirement:

Metrorail Procedure Number: MICC-ADM-PRO-02, METRO 1 Role and Responsibilities Standard Operating Procedure, dated June 24, 2024, states “5.1.5, Coordinates communication between the Senior Leadership Team and the Command Line or their designee for the purpose of reporting on following matters, but not limited to: 5.1.5.1 Facilitate and Manage incident calls via the Operations Service Disruption TEAMS Channel. 5.1.5.2 Reporting to Senior Leadership Team through internal communication channels to by providing timely updates of major service disruption greater than 20 minutes.” They must also, at the same time lead the command line operationally: “5.1.4, Leads the Command Line by providing strategic guidance on bus and rail operational matters.”



These systems are equipped with various alarms; however, the alarm screen visual setup is not uniform.

Nonconformance:

Four different individuals serving in the role of RAIL 1 during interviews stated that the call had distracted them from their main duty: to manage the incident response.

In response to this recommendation, Metrorail stated that “Section 5.1.5 of the Metro 1 Role and Responsibility SOP permits delegation.” The procedure does permit delegation; however, Metrorail should consider whether the present situation of having the individual simultaneously leading incident response and the Operations Service Disruption Teams call is the best default for safety.

The WMSC’s Audit of the Department of Rail Transportation: Rail Operations Control Center, dated September 8, 2020, identified a similar practice:

“Conflicting instructions can be spurred in part by consistent input into the handling of emergency events from people outside the immediate command and control structure inside the ROCC. This can sometimes include directions provided by managers who physically enter the ROCC but can also occur via phone calls such as communication through the Rail Service Disruption Line. The teleconference line is intended to provide important situational awareness for upper-level managers, but ambient recordings of the ROCC show it has also been regularly used to provide real-time direction from afar or to require the superintendent to interrupt the assistant superintendent actively managing an incident. The interruptions with questions lead to the appearance that management is more concerned with updating people outside of the ROCC than actually managing an incident safely and effectively. The WMSC recognizes that senior Metrorail leaders outside the ROCC need to be informed and may direct operations, when necessary, but the WMSC is concerned that a more effective balance is needed to promote a safe environment in the ROCC.”

♦ Recommended Corrective Action:

Metrorail may revise the existing procedure or establish a new process that ensures personnel managing an incident are focused on the incident itself, and safely resolving that incident, while others manage the task of communicating incident details to other Metrorail personnel.

Recommendation 2: Rail traffic controllers Advanced Information Management (AIM) system alarms are not standardized across rail traffic controller desks and personnel are not trained on how to arrange their alarm screens.

Rail traffic controllers utilize Advanced Information Management (AIM) consoles to monitor and control train movements throughout the roadway. These systems are equipped with various alarms; however, the alarm screen visual setup is not uniform. This can lead to alarms being overlooked or hidden that may result in a safety event.



Metrorail does not presently have a procedure or training that outlines the requirements for displaying alarms and which alarms are required in each rail traffic controller's display.

Requirement:

Metrorail Procedure Number MICC-ROC-PRO-03, 'Rail Traffic Controller Responsibilities', dated July 11, 2024, states in section 6.3.10 that "RTCs shall acknowledge alarms in AIM and take appropriate action as required." Each alarm type is then defined with specific actions RTCs must take in case those alarms are displayed on their console.

Nonconformance:

Metrorail does not presently have a procedure or training that outlines the requirements for displaying alarms and which alarms are required in each rail traffic controller's display.

In Metrorail's training presentation for rail traffic controllers, dated November 6, 2023, the training instructor detailed information related to alarm setup; however, the training presentation states that "RTCs have their own preferences for setting up their displays" with one of the best practices listed as "Display the alarm area, specifically the super major, major, and unacknowledged alarms." This variability can lead to inconsistent—or missing—displays of vital alarms in the AIM system.

♦ Recommended Corrective Action:

Metrorail may provide additional training or direction to rail traffic controllers on AIM system alarm setup including review of best practices to ensure that all necessary alarms are properly viewable to all relevant personnel and any preferential alarms are viewable at the individual's discretion.

Recommendation 3: Metrorail does not evaluate the effectiveness of Line Platform Instructors (LPI).

Metrorail personnel serving as line platform instructors serve an important role in the training of new rail vehicle operators. Reviewing the performance of the line platform instructors and their training effectiveness would increase the value of that position and possibly lead to improvement in the training of rail vehicle operators.

Requirement:

The Metrorail Operating Rulebook, dated March 1, 2024, section 1.7.1 states "Operational employees are required to pass examinations on the rules and procedures contained in this manual, as well as on the information contained in other manuals that apply to their assignments. These examinations shall be administered at least once every 12 months. Employees must adhere to the division's notification of scheduled exams and report as specified."

Nonconformance:

Metrorail Procedure Number: SARE-05-0024, 'Line Platform Instructor (LPI) Application and Training Process', dated November 27, 2024, defines Line Platform Instructors as being the personnel "responsible for training new rail vehicle operator candidates and current rail vehicle operators in accordance with the Standards of Operating Procedures (SOP) of the Department of Rail Services". The MOR states in section 8.1 that "Students are permitted to operate rail vehicles when supervised by and in the presence of a qualified instructor or line platform instructor." These personnel are an integral part of Metrorail's process for training all of its rail vehicle operators.

In interviews with personnel from Rail Transportation including the Office of Technical Training personnel stated that there were no current procedures to evaluate line platform instructors and their effectiveness in the training of its rail vehicle operators. Personnel interviewed for this audit including those managing and training rail vehicle operators stated concerns over the training of rail vehicle operators. Line platform instructors and their effectiveness is a critically important factor in this training.

On January 31, 2025, in response to this finding presented at the exit conference for this audit, Metrorail stated that “Rail Operations Quality Training recently assigned instructors to support training at the rail divisions and is in the process of finalizing a work instruction which will include procedures to evaluate LPI performance. This document will be shared with the WMSC once it has been finalized.”

The WMSC appreciates this positive development and ongoing work to address this issue and looks forward to receiving the procedures to evaluate line platform instructor performance.

◆ **Recommended Corrective Action:**

Metrorail should continue the positive steps as identified by its January 31, 2025, reply on the exit conference for this audit and create a work instruction and procedures to evaluate line platform instructor performance. This should include a review of the effectiveness of their training for student rail vehicle operators.



Next Steps

Metrorail is required to propose corrective action plans to address each finding and recommendation no later than 30 days after the issuance of this report. (Program Standard Rev. 7.1, Section 9.C.3.a.) Each proposed corrective action plan must include several elements, including but not limited to, specific and achievable planned actions to remediate the deficiency, the person responsible for implementation, and the estimated date of completion. (Section 9.C.2.) Each proposed corrective action plan must be approved by the WMSC prior to Metrorail's implementation.



Appendices

Appendices A and B

Appendix A: Personnel Interviewed

- Rail Operations
 - Director, Rail Transportation
 - Line Director
 - 2 Superintendent – Field Ops
 - 2 Asst. Superintendent Field Ops
 - Interlocking Operator
 - 2 Rail Operations Supervisors
 - 2 Rail Operations Supervisors/ quality control
 - Station Manager
 - 2 Train Operators
 - MTPD
 - MTPD sergeant
 - MTPD lieutenant
 - Control Center
 - VP, MICC
 - SVP (MICC)
 - Director, Technology & Business Operations
 - Video Manager (Video 1)
 - 11 Rail Traffic Controller
 - 2 Safety Information Officials
 - Operations Manager
 - Power Desk (PDAS)
 - Power Desk Superintendent
 - Power Superintendent
 - Maintenance Controller
 - 2 Maintenance Managers
 - 3 Assistant Directors, MICC
 - 3 Assistant Operations Managers
 - 2 Business Managers
 - Communications Agent
 - Communications Manager
 - Digital Video Evidence Technician
 - Director of Operations, MICC
 - Fire Liaison Officer
- Training
 - Sr. Director, Technical Training and Development
 - Director of Rail Certification
 - Acting Director, Rail Training
 - Rail Training Instructor
 - Rail Traffic Controller Instructor

APPENDIX A: PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED

APPENDIX B: SITE VISITS

Appendix B: Site Visits

- ◆ Wednesday, October 30, 2024
 - Observation of Pre-Trip Inspection at Greenbelt Rail Yard
 - Observations at the control center including Rail Traffic Controllers, Car Maintenance Desk, Power and Maintenance Desks
- ◆ Thursday, October 31, 2024
 - Observation of Rail Training class
 - Observation of Rail Traffic Controllers in the course of their duties at the control center.
- ◆ Friday, November 1, 2024
 - Observation of Rail Vehicle Operator Certification activities
 - Observation of Rail Traffic Controllers in the course of their duties at the control center.
- ◆ Monday, November 4, 2024
 - Observation of Power Desk activities at the control center

Appendix C

Appendix C: Documents Reviewed

ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS AND DEPARTMENT RESPONSIBILITIES:

- Communications Section Organizational Chart (08/26/2024)
- Maintenance Section Organizational Chart (no date)
- MICC Organizational Chart (no date)
- MICC Rail Operations Organizational Chart (08/2024)
- Office of Rail Transportation Organizational Chart (08/19/2024)
- Office of Rail Transportation Organizational Chart (04/27/2023)
- POC Organizational Chart (no date)

ROLES/RESPONSIBILITIES/JOB DESCRIPTIONS/STAFFING:

- Assistant Director, MICC – Job Description (08/25/2023)
- Assistant Chief, Transportation, RA – Job Description (06/05/2024)
- Assistant Communications Manager, UCCC – Job Description (07/18/2024)
- Assistant Operations Manager, ROCC – Job Description (06/05/2024)
- Assistant Superintendent Power Desk Control – Job Description (06/05/2024)
- Assistant Superintendent Power Desk Control – Roles and Responsibilities (no date)
- Assistant Superintendent Service Delivery, MICC – Job Description (07/11/2024)
- Assistant Superintendent, Transit Field Operations – Job Description (no date)
- Budgeted Positions List FY25 (no date)
- Business Manager, MICC – Job Description (12/05/2023)
- Business Manager, UCCC – Job Description (06/05/2024)
- Captain, Metro Transit Police – Job Description (06/05/2024)
- Certification Specialist – Job Description (08/15/2024)
- Chief Transportation Officer – Job Description (06/05/2024)
- Communications Agent, UCCC – Job Description (06/05/2024)
- Communications Manager, UCCC – Job Description (06/05/2024)
- Data Analyst – Job Description (no date)
- Deputy Chief, Metro Transit Police – Job Description (no date)
- Digital Video Evidence Analyst – Job Description (06/05/2024)
- Digital Video Evidence Technician – Job Description (06/05/2024)
- Director, Business Operations, MICC – Job Description (09/13/2024)
- Director, Emergency Resilience, Video and Consequence Management – Job Description (12/13/2023)



**ROLES/RESPONSIBILITIES/JOB DESCRIPTIONS/
STAFFING: (CONTINUED)**

- Director, MICC Communications – Job Description (06/05/2024)
- Director, MICC Operations – Job Description (11/09/2023)
- Director, Rail Line Operations – Job Description (06/05/2024)
- Director, Video Operations, MICC – Job Description (09/15/2023)
- Interlocking Operator: Role and Responsibilities (01/31/2024)
- Lieutenant, Metro Transit Police – Job Description (no date)
- MAINT 1 Code 34 Contact Log (12/27/2023)
- Maintenance Controller, ROCC – Job Description (06/05/2024)
- Maintenance Manager, ROCC – Job Description (06/05/2024)
- Maintenance Work Schedule (05/2024 to 07/2024)
- Management Assistant, TA-16 – Job Description (06/30/1987)
- Management Specialist, TSSM – Job Description (04/25/2009)
- Manager, Administrative Service – Job Description (06/05/2024)
- Manager, Digital Video Evidence – Job Description (02/16/2024)
- Manager, Incident Investigation – Job Description (06/05/2024)
- Manager, RTRA Quality Control – Job Description (02/26/2024)
- Manager, Strategic Initiatives – Job Description (02/16/2024)
- Metro 1 Schedule (04/2024 to 08/2024)
- MICC Communications Section Contractor's List (08/19/2024)
- MICC Communications Section Personnel Data (no date)
- MICC Communications Section Personnel Role and Responsibilities (no date)
- MICC Monthly Staffing Report (07/2024 to 08/2024)
- MICC Personnel Hire Date List (08/08/2024)
- MICC Personnel Information List (no date)
- MICC Work Schedule (05/2024 to 07/2024)
- MOC Employee Roster (08/15/2024)
- Office of Power, Vacancy Report (08/25/2024)
- OM Work Schedule (05/2024 to 07/2024)
- Operations Manager, ROCC – Job Description (no date)
- Organizational Change Manager – Job Description (no date)
- POC Personnel Shift Information List (no date)
- Position Management Report (no date)
- Power Desk Controller – Job Description (06/05/2024)
- Power Desk Controller – Roles and Responsibilities (no date)
- Power Work Schedule (05/2024 to 08/2024)
- Program Manager, Business Operations – Job Description (06/05/2024)
- Project Operations Compliance Specialist – Job Description (no date)



**ROLES/RESPONSIBILITIES/JOB DESCRIPTIONS/
STAFFING: (CONTINUED)**

- Public Communications Coordinator – Job Description (06/05/2024)
- Rail Operations Supervisor – Job Description (06/05/2024)
- Rail Station Supervisor – Job Description (06/05/2024)
- Rail Traffic Controller – Job Description (no date)
- Rail Transportation Contractors (08/05/2024)
- Resilience Integration and Coordination Specialist, Video and Consequence Management, MICC – Job Description (12/05/2023)
- RTCs Staffing Assessment (07/2024)
- RTRA Personnel Status Report (07/25/2024 to 08/2024)
- RTRA Quality Control Officer – Job Description (02/16/2024)
- RTRA Rail Transportation Roster (08/21/2024)
- ROCC Quarterly Staffing Progress Reports (2023)
- ROCC Work Schedule (05/2024 to 07/2024)
- Senior Department Safety Risk Coordinator – Job Description (06/05/2024)
- Senior Director, Video and Consequence Management, MICC – Job Description (09/08/2023)
- Senior Resilience Integration and Coordination Specialist, MICC – Job Description (12/06/2023)
- Senior Technical Writer – Job Description (07/21/2023)
- Senior Vice President, Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center – Job Description (01/31/2023)
- Sergeant, MTPD – Job Description (06/05/2024)
- Superintendent Power Desk Controller – Job Description (06/05/2024)
- Superintendent Power Desk Controller – Roles and Responsibilities (no date)
- Vice President, Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center – Job Description (05/24/2023)



PROCEDURES/POLICIES/MANUALS/FORMS:

- Administrative Work Instruction, Fatigue Risk Management (07/06/2021)
- Annual Recertification AOM and RTC Tracker (2024)
- Customer Experience and Engagement (CXE) Department Guide (07/01/2024)
- Emergency Contact Form (08/2020)
- Emergency Tunnel Fan Operation Form (05/21/2024)
- Incident Response Manual, Maintenance Section Job Aid (02/14/2024)
- Memorandum on BEB Battery Electric Bus (11/13/2023)
- Memorandum on False AIM Indications (08/04/2023)
- Memorandum on Local Control Operation Requirements (10/24/2024)
- Memorandum on MICC Rail Assistant Operations Manager Console Manipulation Report (11/27/2024)
- Memorandum on MICC Rail Section Radio Communications Assessments
- Memorandum on New Hazard Submission Form (03/10/2023)
- Memorandum on New Instructions – External Customer Messaging (08/24/2024)

**PROCEDURES/POLICIES/MANUALS/FORMS:
(CONTINUED)**

- Memorandum on Notifying Union of Operators Harmed (08/10/2023)
- Memorandum on Power Re-Energization for the Unplanned Events on the Roadway (06/07/2024)
- Memorandum on RTRA Rules Efficiency Testing and Annual Plan Frequency Adjustments (07/31/2024)
- Memorandum on SOP 2 Close-out Steps (05/04/2022)
- Memorandum on Teams Meeting Activation for Incident Communication and Coordination (03/08/2023)
- Metro Electronic Device Policy (02/21/2023)
- MetroAlerts: Interim Guidance Document (08/09/2024)
- MICC-ALL-PRO-01, Rail Incident Management in the MICC (06/24/2024)
- MICC-ALL-PRO-02, Receipt of Emergency Trip Station (ETS) Alarm (12/01/2023)

- MICC-ALL-PRO-03, MICC Severe Weather for the Metrorail System (04/23/2024)
- MICC-ALL-PRO-04, Emergency and Maintenance Tunnel Fan Ventilation Procedures (04/22/2024)
- MICC-ALL-PRO-05, Operational Roles in the MICC (06/21/2024)
- MICC-ALL-PRO-06, MICC Rail Operations (04/22/2024)
- MICC-ALL-PRO-07, Rail Operations Computer System (ROCS) Console Management in the MICC (04/22/2024)
- MICC-ALL-PRO-08, MICC Systems and System Failures (04/22/2024)
- MICC-ALL-PRO-09, MICC Shift Turnover and Room Brief (04/22/2024)
- MICC-ALL-PRO-10, Accessing the MICC (12/27/2023)
- MICC-ALL-PRO-11, MICC Customer Focus Process (12/27/2023)
- MICC-ALL-PRO-12, MICC Maximo & Defect Reporting (04/22/2024)
- MICC-ALL-PRO-13, Loss of Shunt Alarm Events (04/26/2024)
- MICC-ALL-PRO-14, Flooding Procedure (05/14/2024)
- MICC-ALL-PRO-15, Train Derailments and Collisions Procedure (06/10/2024)
- MICC-ALL-PRO-16, Hazardous Materials Procedure (07/05/2024)
- MICC-ALL-PRO-17, Suspicious/Unattended Package, Bomb Threat, and Unknown Substance (07/05/2024)
- MICC-ALL-PRO-18, Unauthorized Person(s) on Track, Person(s) Falling to Track, Person(s) Struck by Train (07/05/2024)
- MICC-ALL-PRO-19, Collector Shoe Assembly Incident Response SOP (03/29/2024)
- MICC-ALL-PRO-20, Assistant Superintendent Service Delivery Role and Responsibilities SOP (06/25/2024)
- MICC-COM-ADM-01, Communications Section – Administrative Roles (12/27/2023)
- MICC-ADM-PRO-01, MICC Controlled Document Management Standard Operating Procedure (09/07/2023)





**PROCEDURES/POLICIES/MANUALS/FORMS:
(CONTINUED)**

- MICC-ADM-PRO-02, METRO 1 Role and Responsibilities Standard Operating Procedure (06/24/2024)
- MICC-COM-PRO-01, COMMS 1 Role and Responsibilities Standard Operating Procedures (04/25/2024)
- MICC-COM-PRO-02, Station Opening (Automated) Reporting Protocol Standard Operating Procedure (04/25/2024)
- MICC-COM-PRO-03, COMMS 2 Role and Responsibilities Standard Operating Procedures (04/25/2024)
- MICC-COM-PRO-04, Communications Agent Role and Responsibilities (04/25/2024)
- MICC-COM-PRO-05, Public Communications Coordinator Role and Responsibilities (04/25/2024)
- MICC-COM-PRO-06, Station Opening (Manual) Reporting protocol Standard Operating Procedures (04/25/2024)
- MICC-COM-PRO-07, Communications Section – OJT Standard Operating Procedure (01/04/2024)
- MICC-COM-PRO-08, Communications Section – Training Process (01/10/2024)
- MICC-COM-PRO-09, Communications Section – Scheduling Management Standard Operating Procedure (01/04/2024)
- MICC-COM-PRO-10, Communications Section – Work and Vacation Selection (01/05/2024)
- MICC-COM-PRO-11, Communications Section – Conduct Review Standard Operating Procedure (01/04/2024)
- MICC-P&E-PLN-02, Severe Weather Plan (12/14/2023)
- MICC-P&E-PLN-04, Metro Integrated Command & Communications Center Continuity of Operations Plan (09/20/2023)
- MICC-P&E-PLN-16, Safety Continuity of Operations Plan (02/12/2024)
- MICC-P&E-PLN-21, People, Culture, & Inclusion Continuity of Operations Plan (12/11/2023)
- MICC-P&E-PRO-01, Special Event Coordination Plans (09/26/2023)
- MICC-P&E-TMP-01, Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center Continuity of Operations Plan Template (10/23/2023)
- MICC Rail Section – Document Matrix (01/2025)
- MICC-ROC-MAN-01, Rail Traffic Controller Operations Performance Standardization Program Manual (07/25/2024)
- MICC-ROC-PRO-01, Administrative Roles in the Rail Section (12/02/2023)
- MICC-ROC-PRO-02, Rail Section Training Process Standard Operating Procedure (08/07/2024)
- MICC-ROC-PRO-03, Rail Traffic Controller Responsibilities (07/11/2024)
- MICC-ROC-PRO-04, Rail Section Timesheet Standard Operating Procedure (12/01/2023)
- MICC-ROC-PRO-05, Rail Section Scheduling Management Standard Operating Procedure (12/01/2023)
- MICC-ROC-PRO-06, Rail Section Fatigue Management and Fitness for Duty Standard Operating Procedure (12/01/2023)
- MICC-ROC-PRO-07, Rail Section Exit Interview Standard Operating Procedure (12/01/2023)

**PROCEDURES/POLICIES/MANUALS/FORMS:
(CONTINUED)**

- MICC-ROC-PRO-08, Rail Section Controllers Work and Vacation Selection Standard Operating Procedure (12/1/2023)
- MICC-ROC-PRO-09, Rail Section Conduct Review Standard Operating Procedure (12/01/2023)
- MICC-ROC-PRO-10, Rail Section Internal Assessment Standard Operating Procedure (12/01/2023)
- MICC-ROC-PRO-11, Rail Traffic Controller OJT Procedure (12/01/2023)
- MICC-ROC-PRO-12, Rail Section OJTI Selection Process & Criteria (12/16/2024)
- MICC-ROC-PRO-13, Roadway Worker Protection: Foul Time (12/16/2023)
- MICC-ROC-PRO-14, Roadway Worker Protection: Exclusive Track Occupancy (12/16/2023)
- MICC-ROC-PRO-15, Rail Traffic Controller Ride Along Process (12/16/2023)
- MICC-SMS-PRO-02, Safety Management System Standard Operating Procedure (12/08/2023)
- MICC-SMS-PRO-03, MICC Good Faith Challenge Standard Operating Procedure (12/08/2023)
- MICC-VID-PRO-02, Video Operations Monitoring (11/16/2023)
- MICC-VID-PRO-03, Video Operations Recovery (01/06/2024)
- MICC-VCM-PRO-01, VIDEO 1 Role and Responsibilities Standard Operating Procedure (04/26/2024)
- MOC COMMs Job Aid for Fire Signal Response (04/24/2024)
- MOC Emergency Tunnel Fan Operation Forms (01/2024 to 08/2024)
- MOC Incident Response Manual (02/14/2024)
- Penta Job Aid I, Creating a TTS Audio/Converting a File from Audio to TTS (01/10/2024)
- Penta Job Aid II, Creating and Broadcasting a Live TTS Message (01/10/2024)
- Penta PCx Communications Control System Manual (1995)
- Permanent Order, Modification to General Rule 1.79 (09/06/2023)
- POC-0300-2-01, POC Shift Turnover (12/28/2022)
- POC-0300-3-01, Oversight and Compliance Procedures (10/26/2022)
- POC-SOP-2001-R03, Power Desk Procedures for Power De-Energization/Energization (01/09/2024)
- POC-SOP-2002-R00.0, Administrative Policies and Procedures for Power Operations Center (05/24/2024)
- POC Power Desk Turnover Form (no date)
- POC Training /Evaluation Checklist Power Operations Controller (08/05/2022)
- Power Energization Verification Forms (01/2024 to 08/2024)
- Power Operations Center Sick Report (no date)



PROCEDURES/POLICIES/MANUALS/FORMS: (CONTINUED)

- Procedure 4800-03-01/00, Rail Safety Standards Committee Operations (07/01/2022)
- Public Address Templates and Penta Instructions Guide (01/10/2024)
- Rail Safety Standards Committee Charter (03/01/2023)
- Rail Traffic Controller Operations Performance Standardization Program Manual (05/2021)
- Rail Training Request Form (02/14/2024)
- ROCC Personnel Full-Scale Exercise Participation Debrief Forms (11/2020 to 12/2020)
- RTRA-106-01-02, RTRA Rules Efficiency Testing – Train Operation (10/12/2023)
- RTRA-202-02-00, Office of Rail Transportation Terminal Standards (08/10/2022)
- RTRA-202-02-01, Office of Rail Transportation Terminal Standards (11/20/2023)
- RTRA-301-02-01, SMS Incident Investigation Process (02/29/2024)
- RTRA-303-08-00, Stowing and Deploying Inter-Car Barriers (02/29/2024)
- RTRA-303-13-00, Severe Weather Guidance (03/07/2024)
- RTRA- 502-01-00, Rail Supervisor Proficiency Train Operations (02/29/2024)
- SARE-05-0024, Line Platform Instructor (LPI) Application and Training Process (11/27/2024)
- SOP 0351-3-02/00, Power Operations Center Certification (02/14/2023)
- SOP 2, Third Rail Power Energization and De-energization Procedure (06/07/2024)
- SOP 4, Customer Evacuation from Train (09/24/2021)
- SOP 4A, Customer Self-Evacuation from Trains (10/25/2012)
- SOP 5, Crowd Control at Stations (09/03/2010)



- SOP 13, Undesired Uncoupling or Pull Apart of Cars in a Train (09/03/2010)
 - SOP 24, Sick Customer on a Train (09/03/2010)
 - SOP 40, Procedure for Platform Berthing, Station Servicing and Overruns (08/15/2023)
 - SOP 52, Train Intercom Procedures (03/02/2016)
 - SOP 102-01, Removing and Employee from Service (01/10/2022)
 - Staff Notice on Operator Exiting the Cab – On the Mainline (08/06/2024)
 - Staff Notice on Trains ATO Flas Notifications (08/02/2023)
 - Temporary Order, PYMS Exception to SOP, Appendix A (02/16/2023)
 - Train Operations Guide and Procedural Checklists (10/2023)
 - Train Operator Reference Guide (02/07/2024)
 - WMATA Continuity of Operations Authority-wide Plan (10/23/2023)
- TRAINING:**
- Alexandria Yard Field Trip Participant Manual (02/09/2024)
 - Annual AOM and RTC Recertification Tracker (2024)

**PROCEDURES/POLICIES/MANUALS/FORMS:
(CONTINUED)**

- ATC Ride Along Forms (12/2023 and 03/2024)
- ATC Ride Along Schedule (12/2023 to 05/2024)
- Basics of Portable Fire Extinguisher Use Instructor Guide (06/2024)
- Basics of Portable Fire Extinguisher Use Participant Guide (06/2024)
- Basics of Portable Fire Extinguisher Use Training Guide (06/2024)
- Blue Line Stations Worksheet (no date)
- Certification Exam Study Guide (no date)
- Certifiers Training Records (05/2024 to 07/2024)
- Comprehensive Overview of the MICC Training Records (07/2024 to 08/2024)
- Customer Evacuation Training Document (05/14/2024)
- Customer Service Participant Manual (08/18/2023)

- Derailment and Collision Training Records (11/2024)
- ELM Training Records (07/2024)
- Employee Engagement Survey Results (01/2023 to 11/2023)
- Full-Scale/Tabletop Exercise Participation Debrief Forms (2020 to 2024)
- Green Line Stations Worksheet (no date)
- IMF Tier 2 Refresher ELM Report (01/2025)
- Incident Management Framework Tier 2 Refresher Instructor Guide (11/2024)
- Incident Management Framework Tier 2 Refresher Training Document (no date)
- Incidents and Emergencies Participant Manual (08/18/2023)
- Instructor Course Tracker (no date)
- Interlocking and Terminal Supervisor Job Task Proficiency Evaluations (11/2023 to 06/2024)
- Interlocking Operator Incidents and Emergencies Participant Manual (02/08/2024)
- Interlocking Operator Initial Exam (08/17/2023)
- Interlocking Operator Instructor Guide (11/22/2024)
- Interlocking Operator Introduction to Yard Operations Participant Manual (02/08/2024)
- Interlocking Operator Quiz 1 (08/17/2023)
- Interlocking Operator Radio Communication Participant Manual (02/08/2024)
- Interlocking Operator Re-Certification Records (11/2023 to 07/2024)
- Interlocking Operator Refresher Assessment (08/17/2023)
- Interlocking Operator Refresher Training Participant Manual (01/30/2024)
- Interlocking Operator Refresher Exam (08/17/2023)
- Interlocking Operator Refresher Training Participant Manual (01/30/2024)
- Interlocking Operator Role and Responsibilities Participant Manual (01/31/2024)






TRAINING: (CONTINUED)

- Interlocking Operator Silver Line Phase II N99 Yard Participant Manual (02/03/2024)
- Interlocking Operator Specific Rules for Interlocking Operators Participant Manual (02/08/2024)
- Interlocking Operators Training Records (11/2023 to 07/2024)
- Kiosk and Station Familiarization Participant Manual (08/18/2023)
- Lessons Learned Personnel Sign-Off (no date)
- Line Platform Instructors Training Records (05/2024 to 07/2024)
- LPI Student Evaluation Mainline Forms (01/2022 to 08/2024)
- Memorandum on MICC Communications Section Training Requirements (08/08/2024)
- Maintenance Controller OJT Evaluation Checklist (01/08/2024)
- Maintenance Controller OJT Notes Sheet (01/08/2024)
- MICC Full Scale Exercises Training Records (04/2024 to 08/2024)
- MICC Lessons Learned G01 Smoke and Fire (07/24/2024)
- MICC Phase II CBT: Activation Preparedness Overview Training Records (01/2024)
- MICC Rail Section – Fire and Smoke Training Records (03/2024 to 04/2024)
- MICC Rail Section – Full Scale Exercise Participant Tracker (2022 to 2024)
- MICC Rail Section – Incident Management Framework Training Records (03/2024 to 04/2024)
- MICC Rail Section – MOR Radio Communications Protocols Training Records (04/2024 to 09/2024)
- MICC Rail Section – Refresher Training: 1003-2-01, Incident Management Standard (no date)
- MICC Rail Section – RWP Tracker (2024)
- MICC Rail Section – Tabletop Exercises Training Records (02/2024 to 05/2024)
- MICC Rail Section – Training Matrix and Requirements (no date)
- MICC Rail Sector RWP Tracker (2024)
- MICC Rail Traffic Controller Ride Along Training Records (12/2023 to 05/2024)
- MICC Rail Traffic Controller Roles and Responsibilities Training Records (01/2024)
- MICC Rail Section RWP Tracker (2024)
- MICC Rail Section Training Matrix (no date)
- MICC Rail Section Training MICC Severe Weather for the Metrorail System (09/2024)
- MICC Ride Along – RTCs and ATC Program Summary Sheets (2023 to 2024)
- MICC Ride Along Schedule (03/2024)
- MICC RTC RWP CBT Level 4 Training Records (01/2024 to 07/2024)
- MICC RWP CBT Training Records (01/2024 to 07/2024)
- MICC Severe Weather Training Records (02/2024 to 03/2024)
- MICC Survey Results (04/29/2024)
- New Certification Exam Questions (05/17/2024)

TRAINING: (CONTINUED)

- New Written Exam Questions (07/16/2024)
- OJT Evaluation Signature Sheet (12/20/2023)
- OJT Performance Evaluation Forms (11/2023 to 10/2024)
- Orange Line Stations Worksheet (no date)
- P-2 Assessment Grading (no date)
- Passenger Evacuation from a Train Training Records (07/2024 to 08/2024)
- POC Personnel Training Transcripts (08/28/2024)
- POC Oversight and Compliance Form (11/07/2022)
- POC Training Matrix (08/08/2024)
- Position Certification and Training Requirements List (no date)
- Procedures and Reports Participant Manual (08/18/2023)
- Radio Communications Participant Manual (08/18/2023)
- Radio Communications Protocols and Compliance Training (03/18/2024)
- Rail Instructor Audits Evaluations (2022 to 2024)
- Rail Operations Quality Training, Fire Extinguisher Training/ TO Incidents and Emergencies (11/2023)
- Rail Operations Quality Training, Fire Extinguisher/System Walk (01/05/2024)
- Rail Operations Quality Training, Incidents and Emergencies (11/2023 to 01/2024)
- Rail Operations Quality Training, Rail Vehicle Operator 25-01 Incidents and Emergencies (07/2024 to 08/2024)
- Rail Operations Supervisor Line Platform Instructor Training (08/09/2023)
- Rail Operations Supervisor Line Platform Instructor Training Course Materials (08/09/2023)
- Rail Operations Supervisors Training Records (05/2024 to 07/2024)
- Rail Station Supervisor (RSS) Customer Service Participant Manual (07/29/2024)
- Rail Station Supervisor (RSS) Incidents and Emergencies Participant Manual (07/29/2024)
- Rail Station Supervisor (RSS) Profession Participant Manual (07/29/2024)
- Rail Station Supervisors Training Records (05/2024 to 07/2024)
- Rail Supervisor Incidents and Emergencies Quiz (08/16/2023)
- Rail Supervisor Incidents and Emergencies Test (08/16/2023)
- Rail Supervisor Profession Quiz (08/16/2023)
- Rail Supervisor Profession Test (08/16/2023)
- Rail Supervisor Terminal Quiz (08/16/2023)
- Rail Traffic Controller Course Assessments (05/2024 to 08/2024)
- Rail Traffic Controller Course EOW Assessments (12/2023 to 01/2024)
- Rail Traffic Controller Course Pre-Test (11/2023)
- Rail Traffic Controller Exam Questions (07/26/2024)



TRAINING: (CONTINUED)


- Rail Traffic Controller Fundamentals Course Survey (no date)
- Rail Traffic Controller Fundamental Instructor Guide (no date)
- Rail Traffic Controller Fundamentals Participant Guide (no date)
- Rail Traffic Controller Operations Performance Standardization Manual (05/2021)
- Rail Traffic Controller Participant Guide (no date)
- Rail Traffic Controller Post-Course Evaluation Survey (no date)
- Rail Traffic Controller Practical Exams (06/2024 to 10/2024)
- Rail Traffic Controller Recertification Attempt 3 (07/10/2024)
- Rail Traffic Controller Slides Week 1 to 5 (11/06/2023)
- Rail Traffic Controller Simulations Instructor Guide (no date)
- Rail Traffic Controller Simulations Participant Workbook (no date)
- Rail Traffic Controller Training Slides Lessons 1 to 10 (03/25/2024)
- Rail Traffic Controller Workbook Simulations (11/06/2023)
- Rail Traffic Controllers OJT AM Shift Instructor Guide (no date)
- Rail Traffic Controllers OJT AM Shift Participant Workbook (no date)
- Rail Traffic Controllers OJT PM Shift Instructor Guide (no date)
- Rail Traffic Controllers OJT PM Shift Participant Workbook (no date)
- Rail Training Request Forms (11/2023 to 08/2024)
- Rail Transportation Weekly Audit Reports (08/2024 to 11/2024)
- Rail Vehicle Operators Training Records (05/2024 to 07/2024)
- Recurrent Training Detraining and Collision (11/2024)
- Red Line Stations Worksheet (no date)
- Ride Along Forms (2022 to 2024)
- ROCC Controller Certification Exam Coaching Report (06/2024 to 10/2024)
- ROCC RTC Fire and Smoke Training (07/2024 to 09/2024)
- ROCC Ride Along Forms (03/2022 and 12/2023)
- ROQT Train Operator Refresher Exam (08/14/2023)
- ROQT Training Matrix (08/26/2024)
- RPM Computer Training Participant Manual (01/31/2024)
- RTC Instructor Guide: Activity Notes Form (no date)
- RTC Ride Along Forms (03/2024 to 04/2024)
- RTC Ride Along Report (2022 to 2024)
- RTC Roles and Responsibilities Training Records (07/2024 to 08/2024)
- RTC Training: Alphanumeric Codes Worksheets (no date)
- RTC Training: Alphanumeric Flashcards (no date)
- RTC Training: Class Document List (no date)
- RTC Training: Cross Week Assessments (05/2024 to 08/2024)



TRAINING: (CONTINUED)

- RTC Training, Lesson 1 Worksheet: Introduction to WMATA and the MICC (no date)
- RTC Training, Lesson 2 Worksheet: WMATA Rail System (no date)
- RTC Training, Lesson 3 Worksheet: Advanced Information Management (AIM) System (no date)
- RTC Training, Lesson 4 Worksheet: Communication (no date)
- RTC Training, Lesson 5 Worksheet: Documentation (no date)
- RTC Training, Lesson 6 Worksheet: Single Tracking Operations (no date)
- RTC Training, Lesson 7 Worksheet: Troubleshooting (no date)
- RTC Training, Lesson 8 Worksheet: RWP and Track Access (no date)
- RTC Training, Lesson 9 Worksheet: Fans (no date)
- RTC Training, Lesson 10 Worksheet: Owl Shift (no date) Yellow Line Stations Worksheet (no date)
- RTRA Personnel Training Transcripts (08/2024)
- RTRA URCP Modal Program Plan (03/04/2024)
- RTRA URCP Rules Compliance Test, Station Stopping and Door Operations (10/2024 to 11/2024)
- RTRA URCP Rules Compliance Test, Zero Speed Command Operations (10/2024 to 11/2024)
- RTRS URCP Rules Compliance Test, AMF Operations (10/2024 to 11/2024)
- ROCC Controller Certification Exam Coaching Report (06/2024)
- ROCC Lessons Learned RSIG (04/15/2023)
- ROCC Ride Along Training Records (03/2022 to 04/2022)
- ROCC TRST Ride Along ELM Report (04/2022)
- ROQT Class Calendar (01/2022 to 04/2024)
- ROQT (T3): Take/Observe/Teach Training (05/2024)
- ROQT Take/Observe/Teach: 7k Simulator Pilot Program (no date)
- ROQT Take/Observe/Teach: 7k Training - Classroom (no date)
- ROQT Take/Observe/Teach: T3-RVO Refresher (no date)
- ROQT Take/Observe/Teach: T3-Train Operator Refresher Training (no date)
- ROQT Train Operator Refresher Exam (08/14/2023)
- ROQT Train-the-Trainer: Controller Entry and Skills (no date)
- ROQT Train-the-Trainer: Controller Entry Skills and Task (no date)
- ROQT Train-the-Trainer: Instructor Thacker (no date)
- ROQT Train-the-Trainer: Intro to RTC (no date)
- ROQT Train-the-Trainer: Intro to RTC Training (no date)
- ROQT Train-the-Trainer: MSRPH (no date)
- ROQT Train-the-Trainer: Process (no date)
- ROQT Train-the-Trainer: Radio (no date)





TRAINING: (CONTINUED)

- ROQT Train-the-Trainer: Radio Communications (no date)
- ROQT Train-the-Trainer: Territory Familiarization (no date)
- ROQT Train-the-Trainer: Track Access and Protection (no date)
- ROQT Train-the-Trainer: Traffic Management and Strategies (no date)
- ROQT Train-the-Trainer: Troubleshooting (no date)
- ROQT Training Matrix (08/26/2024)
- RTC Training, Assessment 1 to 17 (no date)
- RTC Training, Cross Week Assessment (no date)
- Safety Management System Certification Program Training Records (01/2024 to 08/2024)
- Silver Line Stations Worksheet (no date)
- SRTC 25-01 Assessment Grading (no date)
- SRTC 25-01 Trainee Proficiency and Curriculum Tracker (no date)
- SRTCs MICC Rail Training Projection Schedule FY25 (no date)
- Station Manager Customer Service Exam (08/15/2023)
- Station Manager Customer Service Instructor Guide (08/18/2024)
- Station Manager Customer Service Quiz (08/15/2023)
- Station Manager Final Exam (08/15/2023)
- Station Manager Incidents and Emergencies Exam (08/15/2023)
- Station Manager Incidents and Emergencies Instructor Guide (08/18/2024)
- Station Manager Incidents and Emergencies Quiz (08/15/2023)
- Station Manager Kiosk and Station Familiarization Exam (08/15/2023)
- Station Manager Kiosk and Station Familiarization Instructor Guide (09/25/2024)
- Station Manager Kiosk and Station Familiarization Quiz (08/15/2023)
- Station Manager Line Platform Instructor Training (08/06/2023)
- Station Manager Procedures and Reports Exam (08/15/2023)
- Station Manager Procedures and Reports Instructor Guide (08/08/2024)
- Station Manager Procedures and Reports Quiz (08/15/2023)
- Station Manager Radio Communication Exam (08/15/2023)
- Station Manager Radio Communication Instructor Guide (08/18/2023)
- Station Manager Radio Communication Quiz (08/15/2023)
- Station Manager Refresher Course Participant Manual (09/20/2023)
- Station Manager Training Records (05/2024 to 07/2024)
- Student Rail Traffic Controller Disqualification Letter (01/30/2023)
- Student Rail Traffic Controller Disqualification Letter (06/25/2024)

TRAINING: (CONTINUED)

- Student Tracker WMSC MICC Audit (08/12/2024)
- T3 Assessment RVO Refresher (09/2024)
- Terminal Supervisor: Introduction to Terminal Operations Participant Manual (08/29/2023)
- The Rail Supervisor Profession Instructor Guide (11/22/2024)
- The Rail Supervisor Profession Participant Manual (08/19/2023)
- Tower Operators Training Records (05/2024 to 07/2024)
- Train Operators Incidents and Emergencies Participant Manual (02/07/2024)
- Train Operator Lifeline Test 1 (08/14/2023)
- Train Operator Lifeline Test 2 (08/14/2023)
- Train Operator Line Platform Instructor Final Exam (08/14/2023)
- Train Operator Midterm Test (08/14/2023)
- Train Operator Reference Guide (02/07/2024)
- Train Operator Refresher Training, Step 1: Take the Class (no date)

- Train Operator Refresher Training, Step 2: Observe the Class (no date)
- Train Operator Refresher Training, Step 3: Teach the Class (no date)
- Training Data Tracker (10/03/2024)
- Unknown Substance and Suspicious Package Training Records (07/2024 to 08/2024)
- WMATA Railcars Participant Manual (02/07/2024)
- WMATA Rail System Participant Manual (02/07/2024)
- WMATA Rail System Instructor Guide (11/22/2024)
- WMATA Railcars Participant Manual (02/07/2024)
- WMATA Railcars Instructor Guide (11/22/2024)
- WMATA Train Operators Refresher Participant Manual (05/24/2024)
- Yard Field Trips Participant Manual (02/08/2024)
- Yard Movement Coordination Participant Manual (01/31/2024)

INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE:

- COSI Radio PMI, Radio Dispatch Consoles Inspection (04/16/2024)
- Custodial and Landscaping Log (no date)
- Incident Intake and Scripts COMMS 2 (04/25/2024)
- Incident Intake and Scripts MAINT 1 and RAIL 2 (11/30/2023)
- Maintenance 1 End of Shift Summaries (05/2024 to 09/2024)
- Maintenance Section Spill Report Log (01/08/2024)
- Maximo Work Order and Incident Record Entry for ATC Incidents (03/15/2024)
- MICC Rail Section Metrics (05/2024 to 07/2024)
- POC Daily Work Order Schedule (no date)
- Rail Operations Control, Line Supervisors Logs (05/2024 to 07/2024)
- Red Bag (Biohazard) Waste Report (01/08/2024)



INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE: (CONTINUED)

- RSDAR Data (05/2024 to 07/2024)
- RTRA Weekly KPI Reports (04/28/2024 to 08/03/2024)

INTERNAL REVIEWS:

- 2024 Internal Audit Plan (02/16/2024)
- After-Action Report, 2023 Captiol South Tabletop and Full-Scale Exercise Series (11/2024)
- After-Action Report, 2023 Virginia Square Metro Station Tabletop and Full-Scale Exercise Series (03/2024)
- After-Action Report, WMATA 2021-2022 Silver Line Exercise Series (10/2022)
- Compliance Audits and Tests Completed by the Rail Quality (09/2024 to 10/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Announcements – Trains, Various Locations (02/21/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Announcements – Trains, Various Locations (02/22/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Announcements – Trains, Various Locations (04/09/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Announcements – Trains, Various Locations (04/24/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Announcements – Trains, Various Locations (07/11/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Documentation – Stations, Various Locations (04/12/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Car Stop/Head out Window, Archives/Navy Memorial (07/18/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Car Stop/Head out Window, Farragut North (02/28/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Car Stop/Head out Window, L'Enfant Plaza (07/19/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Car Stop/Head out Window, McPherson (01/17/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Car Stop/Head out Window, Potomac Ave (04/02/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Car Stop/Head out Window, Smithsonian (04/11/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Car Stop/Head out Window, Virginia Square (01/22/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Electronic Device Towers, New Carrollton Yard (01/25/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, EV Shutdown, All RTRA Divisions (01/16/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, EV Shutdown, All RTRA Divisions (04/05/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Radio Communications Terminal, Alexandria Yard (07/15/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Radio Communications Terminal, Dulles (01/22/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Radio Communications Terminal, Dulles (04/18/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Radio Communications Terminal, Branch Ave (03/21/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Radio Communications Terminal, Franconia-Springfield (07/16/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Radio Communications Terminal, Greenbelt (03/22/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Radio Communications Terminal, Greenbelt (07/22/2024)



INTERNAL REVIEWS: (CONTINUED)

- Internal Audit Report, Radio Communications Terminal, Huntington (07/17/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Radio Communications Terminal, New Carrollton (01/08/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Radio Communications Terminal, New Carrollton (04/09/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Radio Communications Terminal, Shady Grove (02/05/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Radio Communications Terminal, Vienna (04/09/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Radio Communications Tower, Alexandria Yard (07/17/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Radio Communications Tower, Branch Ave Yard (07/15/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Radio Communications Tower, Dulles (01/22/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Radio Communications Tower, Dulles (04/25/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Radio Communications Tower, West Falls Church Yard (01/29/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Radio Communications Tower, West Falls Church Yard (04/04/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Red Signal Aspect/Zero Speed Command, Ballston (04/10/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Red Signal Aspect/Zero Speed Command, McLean (01/31/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Red Signal Aspect/Zero Speed Command, Pentagon City (07/16/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Remove Revenue End of Line/Pocket Track, Branch Ave (03/21/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Remove Revenue End of Line/Pocket Track, Branch Avenue (07/10/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Remove Revenue End of Line/Pocket Track, Dulles (04/18/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Remove Revenue End of Line/Pocket Track, Greenbelt (07/22/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Remove Revenue End of Line/Pocket Track, New Carrollton (04/09/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Remove Revenue End of Line/Pocket Track, Shady Grove (02/05/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Roadway/Hand Signal Acknowledgement, Braddock Road (07/25/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Terminal Ops, Branch Ave (07/15/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Terminal Ops, Dulles (01/22/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Terminal Ops, Dulles (04/18/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Terminal Ops, Franconia-Springfield (07/16/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Terminal Ops, Huntington (07/17/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Terminal Ops, New Carrollton (01/08/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Terminal Ops, New Carrollton (04/09/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Terminal Ops, Shady Grove (02/05/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Terminal Ops, Vienna (01/08/2024)



INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE: (CONTINUED)

- Internal Audit Report, Terminal Ops, Vienna (04/09/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Tower Ops, Branch Ave. Yard (07/11/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Tower Ops, Brentwood Yard (02/05/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Tower Ops, Glenmont Yard (02/06/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Tower Ops, Greenbelt Yard (07/15/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Tower Ops, New Carrollton Yard (01/23/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Tower Ops, Shady Grove Yard (02/05/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Train Storage, Branch Ave Yard (07/22/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Train Storage, Greenbelt Yard (07/22/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Yard Pre-Trip Inspections, Alexandria Yard (04/04/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Yard Pre-Trip Inspections, Alexandria Yard (07/17/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Yard Pre-Trip Inspections, Dulles (01/22/2024)

- Internal Audit Report, Yard Pre-Trip Inspections, Dulles (04/25/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Yard Pre-Trip Inspections, Greenbelt Yard (07/10/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Yard Pre-Trip Inspections, New Carrollton Yard (04/04/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Yard Pre-Trip Inspections, West Falls Church Yard (01/29/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Yard Safety Stops, Alexandria Yard (07/22/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Yard Safety Stops, Branch Ave Yard (07/22/2024)
- Internal Audit Report, Yard Safety Stops, Greenbelt Yard (07/22/2024)
- Internal Safety Review, Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center Rail Section (02/08/2024)
- Internal Safety Review, Office of Rail Transportation (08/16/2024)
- RTRA QA/QC Audit Log (01/2024 to 08/2024)
- WMATA Origami Data Pull MICC (08/12/2024)
- WMATA Origami Data Pull RTRA (08/12/2024)
- WMATA Origami Data Pull ROCC (08/12/2024)

SAFETY CERTIFICATION:

- Corrective Actions Log (09/2024 to 10/2024)



Appendix D

Appendix D: PTASP Elements

1. General Requirements

- a. Transit Agency Information
- c. Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (including Infectious Disease Mitigation)
- d. Safety Performance Targets (including Safety Performance Target Setting Methodology and Timeline, Safety Performance Targets, and System Reliability Targets)
- f. Development and Implementation of a Safety Management System (SMS)

2. Safety Management Policy

- a. Safety Management Policy Statement
- b. Employee Safety Reporting Program
- c. Communication of the Safety Management Policy
- d. Necessary Authorities, Accountabilities, and Responsibilities (including Accountable Executive, SMS Executive, Agency Leadership and Executive Management, Key Staff, and Safety Committees)

3. Safety Risk Management

- a. Safety Risk Management (SRM) Process (including Safety Hazard Identification, Safety Risk Assessment, and Safety Risk Mitigation)
- b. Ongoing Management of Safety Risk (including Occupational Safety and Health Risk Management, Operational Safety Risk Management, Safety Certification, and Environmental Risk Management)

4. Safety Assurance


- a. Safety Performance Monitoring and Measurement (including Monitoring Operations and Maintenance Procedures, Monitoring of Operational Risk Mitigations, Safety Investigations, Information Monitoring, and Emergency Risk Management)
- b. Management of Change
- c. Continuous Improvement
- d. Corrective Action Plans

5. Safety Promotion

- a. Competencies and Training (including Employee Safety Training, Safety Rules and Procedures Training, Contractor Safety, Training Recordkeeping, Compliance with Training Requirements, and SMS-specific Training Requirements)
- b. Safety Communication (including Direct Staff Communication, Hazard and Safety Risk Information, and Employee Safety Reporting Program Engagement)

6. Documentation





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