WMSC Issues Audit of Metrorail’s Emergency Management and Life Safety Programs

The scope of the audit, which was conducted from August 2024 to October 2024, included the assessment of all components of the as-designed/built rail or fixed-guideway system that runs in Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia (see Metrorail map below); system modifications; installed equipment; operational practices and procedures; maintenance; hazardous material events; and associated training. Life safety and emergency preparedness/response equipment comprises, but is not limited to, access and egress routes, communication equipment, alarm systems, suppression systems, and ventilation systems, according to WMSC.

The audit also reviewed closed corrective action plans from WMSC’s Emergency Management and Fire and Life Safety audit released in February 2022, as well as other relevant corrective action plans, and investigation reports. (Scroll down to download the 65-page audit.)

As a result, WMSC issued these five findings requiring Metrorail to develop corrective action plans:

1. “Metrorail does not have a reliable communication system for operations or emergencies.” The minimum corrective action is: “Metrorail must identify all radio communication deficiencies (inability to transmit or inability to clearly understand the transmission) and establish both long-term infrastructure solutions and short-term mitigations for the identified radio communication deficiencies. Personnel, including rail traffic controllers, rail vehicle operators, and roadway personnel must be made aware of the locations of area outages through regular documented notifications. Metrorail must establish an ongoing process that maintains the radio system in a reliable state systemwide.”
2. “Metrorail Emergency Trip Stations (ETS) located throughout the system are not treated as fire life safety assets.” The minimum corrective action is: “Metrorail must review all departmental procedures (Safety, Power, Infrastructure, Information Technology, Facilities Maintenance, etc.) related to emergency trip stations and ensure proper alignment on the responsibilities for the inspection, preventive and corrective maintenance, and prioritization of all emergency trip stations. Emergency trip stations must be identified and repaired on a timeline commensurate with the function they are intended for, that is fire life safety and emergency functions. There must be clear responsibility for identification of emergency trip stations that are in need of repair and notification to proper departments for resolution. Out of service emergency trip stations must clearly indicate, in a manner readily understood by all personnel, what aspect of the emergency trip station is not in service.”
3. “Metrorail fire and life safety inspections do not identify and resolve deficiencies with fire life safety equipment and assets within stations.” Minimum corrective action: “Metrorail must review all departmental procedures for inspections, preventive, and corrective maintenance related to fire life safety issues (this includes but is not limited to assets, equipment, and blocked egress routes) and ensure that inspections are identifying all such fire life safety issues. Inspections should focus on the fire life safety assets but also maintenance issues which could negatively impact their use in an emergency. The inventory of each station’s life safety assets should be reviewed to ensure that all assets are properly captured. Metrorail must regularly communicate with front-line personnel to underscore the importance of identifying, addressing, or reporting emergency pathways that are observed as blocked and the importance of keeping these pathways free of debris, construction materials, or any other item that may impede egress in an emergency.”
4. “Metrorail is using emergency radio operations channel 6 although the channel is not ready for use.” Minimum corrective action: “Metrorail must review and update its Emergency Operation Plans and Incident Management Framework for communication during safety events. Metrorail must update its training to ensure that all personnel involved in safety events are aware of the proper communication channel whether that is Ops Channel 6, the normal Ops Channel for that section of the system, or a different Ops Channel. Metrorail may not use Ops Channel 6 until such time that it is available to all parties and personnel are properly trained on its use.”
5. “Metrorail is not contacting jurisdictional emergency services immediately upon identification of fire and smoke on the Metrorail system.” Minimum Corrective Action: “Metrorail must review and update Metrorail Procedure Number 678 (Procedure for Managing Fire and Smoke on the Metrorail System) so that it is consistent with the 2024 WMATA-MWCOG Emergency Policy Agreement (and any successor agreement) to ensure both are in alignment with and support the procedures, operations, and expectations of Metrorail’s jurisdictional emergency service partners. Provide the hazard analysis for final governing procedure. Metrorail must train control center personnel who may be involved in fire and smoke events on the revised procedural requirements. Metrorail must submit evidence showing the new procedures in place and the associated response times for fire/smoke events.”

Additionally, WMCS’s audit identified five positive practices, which the commission encouraged Metrorail to continue:

1. “Familiarization Training with Jurisdictional Partners.” Metrorail invites the jurisdictions to Metrorail facilities for reviews, tours, full scale exercises, and training, and also visits each jurisdiction, WMCS reported.
2. “After Action Reports/Issue Tracking for Continuous Improvement.” According to WMCS, WMATA’s transit police department “developed a documented process to compile and implement lessons learned from after action reports and incident debriefs relating to emergency response and management in the Metrorail system,” enabling it to communicate the lessons learned and to track and mitigate issues.
3. “Master Location Repository/Signage Improvements.” Metrorail created a master location repository to ensure accurate addresses for all stations and their respective entrances, according to WMCS. It also coordinated with each jurisdiction to ensure that they all had the same, and correct, addresses for Metrorail facilities and buildings. “All stations now feature signs within each kiosk that provide the street address so that personnel, along with first responders, can quickly reference the correct address,” WMCS reported.
4. “Updated/Digital Fire Maps.” Newly revised Metrorail emergency response maps represent an “improvement in clarity and organization,” according to WMCS, which noted that Metrorail provided the maps (physical copies and digital versions) to its jurisdictional partners.
5. “Station Manager Emergency Preparedness Training/Equipment.” WMCS reported that during each of its 15 station visits, all station managers had “proper equipment, including properly working automated external defibrillators (AED), [and] communication equipment (bull horns, announcement system), and all station managers properly demonstrated equipment, including the use of the communication equipment and operation/opening of all faregates during an emergency.”

Next Steps

Metrorail is now required to propose corrective action plans to address each WMSC finding no later than 30 days after the report’s issuance (Jan. 29). Each proposed corrective action plan must have several elements, including but not limited to, “specific and achievable planned actions to remediate the deficiency, the person responsible for implementation, and the estimated date of completion,” according to WMSC, which must approve each proposed corrective action plan prior to Metrorail’s implementation.

Download WMCS Audit of Metrorail’s Emergency Management and Life Safety Programs:

Further Reading:

• WMSC Audits WMATA’s Railcar Program
• WMSC Issues Safety Audit of WMATA’s Automatic Train Control, Signals Program