Let’s resume where I left off, moving right along, next up: The NPRM intends to amend section 236.1029, PTC System Use and Failures. The provisions authorizing “temporary exceptions” to the prohibition on trains operating when experiencing an initialization failure expired Dec. 31, 2022. Those provisions specific to individual trains experiencing initialization failures allowed dispatchment of the failed train into PTC territory as if, under the same authority and the same restrictions governing trains with failures enroute. Nice work if you could get it, and you could get it until Dec. 31, 2022.
This time around, this iteration is not intended to include or authorize dispatchment of a particular train with a localized PTC failure. Rather:
FRA’s intention in this NPRM is to address only system-level outages or failures that result in multiple trains’ PTC systems failing to initialize, like when a back-office server goes down, impacting the trains of the host railroad and most, if not all, of its tenant railroads. Accordingly, FRA proposes to provide a caveat in proposed paragraph (g)(4), which would specify that the relief under paragraph (g)(1), discussed below, does not apply to a single train that experiences an onboard PTC system failure when attempting to initialize.
So let’s go back to Question A: “How often are system-level failures occurring? And again, FRA is ready with an answer:
Additionally, based on voluntary reporting by railroads, FRA is aware of eight (8) system-level outages that occurred in 2023 that caused multiple trains to fail to initialize
Eight (8)? Thirty-seven (37) carriers? Three hundred sixty-five (365 days)? And eight (8). Tell us about the eight (8). How extensive, geographically were these? Were these system failures affecting the entirety of a particular railroad, or a portion of the railroad like a single division? What were the durations of these eight (8)? How many trains were delayed in their initial terminals, and for how long? How many trains were enroute when the failures occurred, and what steps were taken to preserve the safety of those movements?
Good question, yes? And the answers are … ? We don’t know because the reporting by railroads is voluntary. How can that be? Isn’t that failure a failure to initialize or failure enroute? And don’t those failures require quarterly reporting on FRA Form F 6180.152 (OMB Control No. 2130-0553)? Let me check, first with the legislation:
SEC. 22414. QUARTERLY REPORT ON POSITIVE TRAIN CONTROL
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE.
“Section 20157 of title 49, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
‘‘(m) REPORTS ON POSITIVE TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEM PERFORMANCE.
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Each host railroad subject to this section or subpart I of part 236 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations shall electronically submit to the Secretary of Transportation a Report of PTC System Performance on Form FRA F 6180.152, which shall be submitted on or before the applicable due date set forth in paragraph (3) and contain the information described in paragraph (2),which shall be separated by the host railroad, each applicable tenant railroad, and each positive train control governed track segment, consistent with the railroad’s positive train control Implementation Plan described in subsection (a)(1).
‘‘(2) REQUIRED INFORMATION.—Each report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include, for the applicable reporting period,
‘‘(A) the number of positive train control system initialization failures, disaggregated by the number of initialization failures for which the source or cause was the onboard subsystem, the wayside subsystem, the communications subsystem, the back-office subsystem, or non-positive train control component;
‘‘(B) the number of positive train control system cut outs, disaggregated by each component listed in subparagraph (A) that was the source or cause of such cut outs;
‘‘(C) the number of positive train control system malfunctions, disaggregated by each component listed in subparagraph (A) that was the source or cause of such malfunctions;
‘‘(D) the number of enforcements by the positive train control system;
‘‘(E) the number of enforcements by the positive train control system in which it is reasonable to assume an accident or incident was prevented;
‘‘(F) the number of scheduled attempts at initialization of the positive train control system;
‘‘(G) the number of trai- miles governed by the positive train control system; and
‘‘(H) a summary of any actions the host railroad and its tenant railroads are taking to reduce the frequency and rate of initialization failures, cut outs, and malfunctions, such as any actions to correct or eliminate systemic issues and specific problems.
(Etc. etc.)
I am not a lawyer, or a member of Congress, or a regulator—career options I discarded as soon as I was hired as a brakeman—but it seems clear to me that the reporting requirement applies to any, every, and all initialization failures, whether isolated or systemic.
Surely, along with the provisions authorizing and ensuring safe train operations during PTC system failures, the proposed amendments to the rule will seize the opportunity to explicitly require detailed reporting of system failures that lead to railroads utilizing the procedures authorized by the amended 236.1029. Surely. Surely?
Not! The proposed amendment contains no such language and no such requirements.
So (A), FRA does not, or cannot, provide data that describes the impact of this “problem,” or if it even amounts to a problem. Anecdotes are not data.
And then there’s this, call it (B), risk. The NPRM uses the term “risk” about a dozen times in the text, yet at no point does FRA demonstrate or refer to a risk analysis it, FRA, performed evaluating the elevated risk, if any, these amendments present to safe train operations by providing for the movement of a single or multiple trains when PTC is inoperative.
Certainly, FRA imposes speed restrictions, and requires railroads to submit risk-mitigation programs on such movements, but FRA provides no overall assessment of the effectiveness or lack of such restrictions in offsetting the elevated opportunities for human error caused accidents when PTC does not enforce against those accidents.
The applications of the FRA-proposed restrictions produce questions about FRA’s risk assessment. For example, when and if a passenger railroad opts to deadhead a single set of equipment with inoperative PTC, “there cannot be any working limits established under part 214 of this chapter or any roadway workers on any part of the route” (proposed 236.1006 (b)(6)(iii).
When a system failure occurs, however, when all trains are operating without PTC, “Each railroad operating in accordance with paragraph (g)(1) of this section will notify, as early as possible, all dispatchers, train crews and roadway workers about PTC system-level outages or failures that result in multiple trains’ PTC systems failing to initialize … Railroads must ensure that job safety briefings reflect such operations” (proposed 236.1029 (g)(2)).
Similarly, for those periods when PTC systems must be temporarily disabled for maintenance, repair or upgrade and all trains are to be operated without operable PTC, proposed 236.1021(m)(4)(ii)(I) requires “… each impacted railroad will notify all applicable dispatchers, train crews and roadway workers about the temporary PTC system outage including the specific location and duration of the temporary outage, the additional safety measures with which the railroad must comply, and any actions the individual must take during the temporary outage.”
Maybe I’ve lost a step (no maybes about that, maybe), but if those who haven’t can explain to me why one train without PTC means no working limits permitted, but all trains without PTC means all working limits permitted, I would be most appreciative.
Call me a fossil, but I think there should have been a risk assessment performed by the regulator itself before proposing options for train movements with disabled control systems.
There is a good place to start assessing such risks, and it’s right in the information filed by the railroads on FRA Form F 6180.152, where PTC enforcements and enforcements preventing accidents must be reported. Deliberate, detailed examination of those occurrences is the logical place to begin an analysis of the risk presented when temporarily operating without PTC.
Start there.
We have had experience with the increased risks of full operations when train control systems are disabled. Cayce, S.C., comes to mind. At least we have a record. That’s what a fossil is: a record of imperfect solutions and successful imperfections. I should know, being one and both.
David Schanoes is Principal of Ten90 Solutions LLC, a consulting firm he established upon retiring from MTA Metro-North Railroad in 2008. David began his railroad career in 1972 with the Chicago & North Western, as a brakeman in Chicago. He came to New York in 1977, working for Conrail’s New Jersey Division. David joined Metro-North in 1985. He has spent his entire career in operations, working his way up from brakeman to conductor, block operator, dispatcher, supervisor of train operations, trainmaster, superintendent, and deputy chief of field operations. “Better railroading is 10% planning plus 90% execution,” he says. “It’s simple math. Yet, we also know, or should know, that technology is no substitute for supervision, and supervision that doesn’t utilize technology isn’t going to do the job. That’s not so simple.”
